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STANDING ALONE: CONFORMITY, COERCION, AND
THE PROTECTION OF THE HOLDOUT JUROR
Jason D. Reichelt*
The holdout juror in felony criminal trials is a product of the near-universal deci-
sion rule in federal and state courts of a unanimous verdict. In recent years,
courts have increasingly inquired into a jury's deliberations when a holdout juror
has been identified amid allegations of misconduct. This Article helps bridge the
considerable gap between cognitive psychology and legal scholarship, analyzing the
thought processes of the holdout juror through the application of empirical evidence
and psychological modeling, to conclude that the improved protection of the hold-
out juror is a necessary and critical component to the preservation of a defendant's
right to a fair trial.
"So how come you vote not guilty?"
"Well, there were 11 votes for guilty. It's not easy to raise my hand and
send a boy off to die without talking about it first."
-Henry Fonda in 12 Angry Men 1
INTRODUCTION
The lone dissenter-sometimes referred to as the "voice of rea-
son"2 -is held in high esteem in American culture. Across the
spectrum of contemporary political and social culture, an idealistic
notion has developed that the underdog who stands alone against
an overwhelming majority and bears the courage of conviction de-
serves to prevail. In politics, we empathize with Jimmy Stewart as he
stands alone on the floor of the U.S. Senate in Mr Smith Goes to
Washington,3 and we lionize the legends described in John F. Ken-
nedy's famous Profiles in Courage.4 To advance the protection of civil
rights, supporters rallied to Rosa Parks for refusing to move to the
* Trial Attorney, United States Department of Justice. J.D., Cornell Law School,
1996. BA., University of Oregon Honors College, 1993. All thoughts, ideas, and opinions
expressed in this Article are those of the author alone. For extremely helpful comments and
conversation, the author is grateful to Professor Stephen P. Garvey, Professor John M. Or-
bell, the Honorable Joel D. Horton, and Melissa Moody. Special thanks to Adam Walker for
his keen insight and steadfast encouragement of this project.
1. 12 ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957).
2. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2005).
3. MR. SMITH GOES TO WASHINGTON (Columbia Pictures 1939).
4. JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE (1955).
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back of the bus in Montgomery, Alabama. Who, after all, would
not want to be Henry Fonda in 12 Angry Men, standing firm as the
sole voice for acquittal against the majority that eventually spares
the life of a hopeless defendant?6 As one scholar recently noted,
"Everyone, it seems, believes in dissent."'
The value placed on dissent, however, is juxtaposed against a so-
cial force that is just as strong, if not stronger: the pressure to
conform. The natural desire to fit in, to avoid the stigma of being
labeled an outsider or outcast, and the impetus to go along with
the majority as a means of earning social acceptance all conspire to
suppress the frequency and forcefulness of dissent. One of the
most controlled environments for analyzing the expression of and
interaction between conformity and dissent is in the examination
of the decision-making process of a trial jury. The federal criminal
trial system and every state, with the exception of two, require
unanimous verdicts for conviction or acquittal in felony trials." The
tension between conformity and dissent, coupled with the unanim-
ity requirement, result in the regular, although infrequent,
occurrence of deadlocked juries that are unable to reach a deci-
sion on guilt or innocence. 9 From a societal and historical
standpoint, we have come to accept that a certain number of
criminal trials will seat juries that, for one reason or another, are
unable to reach a verdict in a particular case. It is certainly not un-
expected that from time to time, twelve strangers who hear
conflicting evidence and argument will be unable to reach a
unanimous opinion on the defendant's guilt or innocence.' °
The most perplexing hung juries, and the ones that receive the
most attention, are those that are deadlocked because of a lone
dissenter. Whenever ajury of twelve people cannot reach a unani-
mous verdict on a vote of 11-1, the immediate assumption is that
there must be something wrong with the holdout or that the dis-
senter was simply being stubborn. Intense public scorn is inflicted
5. See HERBERT KOHL, SHE WOULD NOT BE MOVED (2005).
6. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
7. Gerken, supra note 2, at 1746. See generally CAss R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT (2003) (discussing the benefits of dissent in a wide variety of political and social
contexts).
8. Louisiana and Oregon are the exceptions. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782
(2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.450 (2005). See also infra Part I.A.
9. For a description of the frequency of hung juries in criminal cases, see infra Part
I.B.
10. At least one author would likely disagree that there is ever an acceptable rate of
hung juries, arguing that whenever "a jury is unable to reach such a [unanimous] verdict, a
mistrial wastes both time and resources and further debilitates faith in the judicial system."
Jere W. Morehead, A "Modest" Proposal for Jury Reform: The Elimination of Required Unanimous
Jury Verdicts, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 933, 935 (1998) (footnote omitted).
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upon the holdout following the disclosure of an 11-1 deadlock, to
the extent that legal scholars, often in the context of calls for the
elimination of the unanimity requirement, have referred to holdout
jurors as "eccentric" or "irrational,"" "crackpots" or "screwballs,""
"the obstinate loner," "obsessive," or "morally-challenged.' 3 One
scholar has even referred to the occurrence of holdout jurors as the
"flake factor."
4
These labels and images are further reinforced by anecdotal
evidence-usually reported by people other than the holdout ju-
ror-ofjurors who behave in apparently irrational or irresponsible
ways.1 The anecdotal evidence, however, is little more than that,
and can always be countered by contrary anecdotes. The empirical
evidence of jury decision-making, however, tells a different story.
The popular conception of the eccentric, unreasonable, or irra-
tional juror preventing the jury's unanimous verdict is simply
wrong.' 6 In the last forty years, through empirical research by social
psychologists in the area of jury decision-making, it has become
clear that juries that start deliberations with an overwhelming ma-
jority voting either to convict or to acquit will likely not result in a
11. Michael H. Glasser, Comment, Letting the Supermajority Rule: Nonunanimous Jury Ver-
dicts in Criminal Trials, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659,675 (1997).
12. Jeremy Osher, Note, Jury Unanimity in California: Should it Stay or Should it Go?, 29
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1319, 1347 (1996).
13. Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, 101 MICH. L. REv. 1387, 1398 (2003) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). Another author bemoans the difficulty of removing
"extreme or bizarre personalities from the jury." Morehead, supra note 10, at 937.
14. James Kachmar, Comment, Silencing the Minority: Permitting Nonunanimous Jury Ver-
dicts in Criminal Trials, 28 PAC. LJ. 273, 299 (1996).
15. In one such report, the holdout juror stuck to her position that someone other
than the defendant had committed the crime of stabbing an unarmed man, despite the fact
that the defendant's attorney had conceded in argument that the defendant had, in fact,
stabbed the man. Kachmar, supra note 14, at 299. Other examples abound, including ajuror
who refused to listen to "every word" of the testimony because she thought she could "tell
whether someone is telling the truth by looking at the way he moves his eyebrows," and
another juror who refused to convict on a murder charge because "[s]omeone that good-
looking could not commit such a crime." JUDGE HAROLD J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COL-
LAPSE OF CRIMINALJUSTICE 197-99 (1996).
Finally, defense attorney Robert Duncan related the story of a man he defended in the
1970s on a charge of murder. The defense argued that the defendant had acted in self-
defense, but the jury reported after several hours that it was "hopelessly deadlocked" at
eleven-to-one. After further deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty. In the
elevator, the foreman told Mr. Duncan that the holdout had been a "young hippie girl," and
the jury reached the final verdict by simply not counting her vote. Duncan concluded: "To
my knowledge, this is the only 11 to 1 unanimous acquittal ever returned in the Circuit
Court of Jackson County, Missouri." SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE
AMERICANJURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 199 (1988).
16. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 462-63 (Midway re-
print ed., Univ. of Chi. Press 1986).
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deadlock.17 Further, there is no particular set of demographic char-
acteristics that differentiate holdout jurors from any other jurors.'8
Even more importantly, however, holdout jurors behave and con-
tribute to the deliberation process in the same fashion as other
members of the jury.'9 In at least one study, holdouts were just as
effective as their majority counterparts in their ability to recall legal
definitions or evidence presented through testimony.20 As a result,
"[h] oldouts differ from other jurors chiefly in their perceptions of
the quality of deliberation and agreement on the proper verdict."
21
Legal scholarship that addresses jury decision-making and, in
particular, that makes assumptions about the nature and motiva-
tions of holdouts, has not accounted for the voluminous
contribution of contemporary psychology to this area until re-
cently. In part, this is because "[1] egal scholars, many of whom care
about community values in the law, traditionally lack training in
empirical methods."22 In the last five years, legal scholars have be-
gun to change their approach, having recognized the need to
incorporate social and cognitive psychology into the legal analysis
of human behavior. Especially in the area ofjury dynamics, empiri-
cal research "has revealed a number of specific limitations in the
way individuals process information and make choices among al-
ternatives under conditions of uncertainty-deficiencies that ...
may compromise the workings of our legal system."
2 3
To adequately assess and analyze the thought processes of the
holdout juror and, in particular, to determine the extent to which
the legal system should protect the anonymity and interests of the
holdout in the jury deliberation process, the lessons learned from
17. Id. at 462. In the study conducted by Kalven and Zeisel, the hung jury rate in such
cases was 0%. Id. See generally DennisJ. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical
Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 690-707 (2001) (reviewing
empirical research results on jury decision-making published between 1955 and 1999).
18. REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 149
(1983).
19. Id. (noting that "holdouts spoke as much as other jurors, and there were no sig-
nificant differences between holdouts and nonholdouts [sic] in content of discussion.").
20. Id.
21. Id. at 150.
22. Justin D. Levinson, Suppressing the Expression of Community Values injuries: How "Legal
Priming" Systematically Alters the Way People Think, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1059, 1070 (2005). Other
authors have noted that "the judgment and decisionmaking tradition in psychology has
provoked ... much interest and controversy in legal circles." Lee Ross & Donna Shestowsky,
Contemporary Psychologis Challenges to Legal Theory and Practice, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1087
(2003).
23. Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 22, at 1081. This tradition of cognitive psychology is
distinct from the contemporary movement of law and economics as an approach to legal
scholarship. See infra Part III.
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research in cognitive psychology are essential.2 4 This Article repre-
sents a step towards bridging the gap between legal scholarship
and cognitive psychology with respect to the assessment and analy-
sis of the thought processes of holdout jurors in felony criminal
trials and the opposition they confront.
Part I outlines the historical development of the negative per-
ception of holdoutjurors, particularly in light of the near-universal
unanimity requirement in felony criminal trials. The Part further
discusses the phenomenon and overall frequency of hung juries in
order to define the scope and nature of the issue. Through an
analysis of a sample of federal and state case law, Part II illustrates
how trial and appellate courts have addressed the potential re-
moval of holdout jurors for various reasons, from outright juror
misconduct to a simple refusal to deliberate further. This review of
cases demonstrates the wide range of current practices, heuristics,
and assumptions that courts employ to address issues related to
obstinate holdouts, and traces these practices from the most egre-
gious intrusions into jury deliberations to the more cautious
approaches.
Part III incorporates basic principles of cognitive psychology
into an analysis of the thought processes of the holdout juror. It
begins with a prescriptive model of decision-making, and then
moves through a discussion of the biases that influence individual
jurors. It ends with an extended discussion of psychological
research into conformity pressures, the majority's rejection and
isolation of the deviate, and independence in the face of over-
whelming opposition as applied to the context of jury decision-
making. Part IV builds on this empirical foundation by addressing
two judicial approaches to navigating the balance between prevent-
ing juror misconduct and protecting the secrecy of jury
deliberations. Ultimately, this Part concludes that to protect the
interests of the holdout juror and the integrity of the deliberation
process, the higher value must be placed on preserving the secrecy
of deliberations at the expense of tolerating some level of potential
misconduct. The Part proposes alternatives to judicial intervention
into the deliberation process, and suggests methods for improving
the protection of the holdout juror from being the subject of coer-
cive practices. Finally, this Article concludes by emphasizing the
24. Id. at 1083. ("Knowledge about the determinants of human judgment and behav-
ior can be relevant to legal theory and practice in various ways. In particular, such
knowledge is relevant to our understanding of factors that ... compromise the inferences
and judgments made by triers of fact who must process, remember, and integrate the infor-
mation with which they are presented.").
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developing nexus between psychology and legal scholarship, and
proposes several areas for further study that will enhance the fu-
ture examination and analysis of jury decision-making, particularly
in the context of the lone holdout who stands opposed to the con-
clusions of the overwhelming majority.
I. UNANIMITY AND THE HUNG JURY
"Boy, oh boy-There's always one."
-Juror #3 in 12 Angry Men
25
The rule that a jury must return a unanimous verdict, either
guilty or not guilty, in felony criminal trials is nothing new in the
American system of criminal justice. In fact, only two states, Ore-
gon and Louisiana, allow less than unanimous verdicts for both
convictions and acquittals.2 6 To understand the dynamics involved
in jury decision-making, it is helpful to review briefly the origins of
the unanimity requirement and the occasional debate over its effi-
cacy.
A. The Historical Rule of Decision
1. Origins of the Unanimity Requirement
There is little historical certainty as to the origins of the unanim-
ity requirement, but there are a number of theories and historical
27accounts. The first recorded instance of a unanimous jury verdict
occurred in 1367.2 By the end of the fourteenth century, "unani-
mous verdicts were required in all criminal trials," and were woven
into the fabric of the English common-law jury by the eighteenth
century.2 "The jury was to pronounce the truth, and there was only
25. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
26. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANI-
ZATION 1998, 278-81 (2000). See also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2006); OR. REV.
STAT. § 136.450 (2005).
27. One author has advanced four possible theories for its development: 1) Compur-
gation, the practice of adding jurors until twelve of them agreed; 2) As compensation to the
defendant for the lack of sufficient guarantees of a fair trial; 3) To punish jurors who did not
vote with the majority, and who usually had prior "personal knowledge of the facts of a case";
and 4) From "the medieval concept of consent," which implied unanimity. Glasser, supra
note 11, at 663-64.
28. Osher, supra note 12, at 1326 (citing JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE THE JURY: THE JURY
SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 179 (1994)).
29. Id. at 1326-27.
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The United States neither immediately, nor universally, adopted
the English model of unanimity.3' The authors of the Constitution,
while expressly providing for the right to a trial by jury, were silent
on the issue of unanimity or, for that matter, any rule of decision.
Nevertheless, "as Americans became more familiar with the details
of English common law and adopted these details in their own co-
lonial legal systems, unanimity became the accepted rule in the
United States during the eighteenth century."33 In criminal trials,
the principle of unanimity became a core value: because a jury's
decision is singular and unanimous, the result appears to be le-
gitimate, and the parties and the general public are more likely to
respect the outcome.
In twentieth-century America, on the federal level, jury unanim-
ity in criminal trials has consistently been the rule, having been
declared one of the fundamental requirements of a federal jury
trial.35 The Supreme Court, in holding thatjury unanimity is a con-
stitutional requirement in federal criminal trials, relied heavily on
common-law tradition and the "historical acceptance" of the una-
nimity rule.36
The same rule, however, has not been imposed on the states:
To date, only two states, Oregon and Louisiana, allow for non-
unanimous verdicts in felony criminal jury trials. In 1934, Oregon
voters, concerned about the frequency of hung juries, amended
the state constitution to permit verdicts of 10-2 for conviction or
381acquittal. In 1928, Louisiana voters passed legislation allowing
30. RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 94 (2003).
31. Glasser, supra note 11, at 664. During the seventeenth century, four states rejected
the unanimity requirement and instead included provisions in their state constitutions al-
lowing for a jury to return a majority verdict. Id. These states were North Carolina, South
Carolina, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania. Id. at 664 n.59. See also Morehead, supra note 10, at
938 (discussing the history of the unanimity requirement).
32. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
33. Glasser, supra note 11, at 664.
34. JONAKAIT, supra note 30, at 95.
35. SeeJohnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 369 (1972) (Powell,J., concurring).
36. Osher, supra note 12, at 1330. See also Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288
(1930) (holding that the unanimity rule is one of the "essential elements" of ajury trial).
37. See, e.g.,Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167 (1912); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581
(1900).
38. See Kachmar, supra note 14, at 278. See also OR. CONST. art. I, § 11, codified at OR.
REv. STAT. § 136.450 (2005).
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votes of 9-3 to convict or acquit in felony criminal trials.39 These
two aberrant systems remained in place until a set of constitutional
challenges in federal court resulted in two landmark cases decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court on the same day: Apodaca v. Oregon,4°S• 41
and Johnson v. Louisiana.
2. Apodaca and Johnson: Studies in
Psychological Assumptions
The two cases were fairly straightforward. In Apodaca, two of the
defendants were convicted on 11-1 verdicts, while the third defen-
dant was convicted on a 10-2 vote.42 In Johnson, the defendant was
convicted on a 9-3 vote. 3 In both cases, the Supreme Court held,
in 5-4 decisions with Justice Powell concurring in the judgment of
the Court, that both jury trial decision rules were constitutional
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 4 As a result, to this day, Oregon and
Louisiana remain the only two states that allow juries to convict or
acquit a defendant with less than a unanimous verdict in a wide
array of criminal trials 5
What is remarkable about the Apodaca and Johnson decisions is
not so much the outcome of the constitutional questions, but
rather, the extent to which the Justices relied on sweeping assump-
tions about the psychology of jury decision-making in both the
majority and dissenting opinions. As one psychologist generously
noted: "[E] mpirical evidence lacking, the Justices [were] forced to
rely on their own judgment as to how people will behave and on
the probable consequences of their rulings. ''46 Other psychologists
have not been so kind: 'Just as we are not constitutional lawyers, it
is clear that the justices of the high court are not social psycholo-
gists."4
7
39. Kachmar, supra note 14, at 278. See also LA. CONST. art. VII, § 41. This statute has
since been amended to allow for 10-2 verdicts in certain felony criminal cases. See LA. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 782 (2006).
40. Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
41. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
42. Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406.
43. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 358.
44. See Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411-14;Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362-65.
45. William S. Neilson & Harold Winter, The Elimination of Hung Juries: Retrials and
Nonunanimous Verdicts, 25 IsrT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1, 2 (2005).
46. Charlan Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority vs. Unanimity De-
cision Rules, 7J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 38 (1977).
47. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 200.
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Instead of relying on empirical psychological evidence of how
jurors behave, the Court "speculated freely about social influence
processes within the jury room, interactions between majority and
minority factions, and the like." 8 The sections of the opinions
where wild speculation was most prevalent occurred in the discus-
sions of the need for, and degree of appropriate protection for,
jurors who were holding out for acquittal. For the majority, Justice
White offered the following theory ofjury deliberations:
We have no grounds for believing that majority jurors, aware
of their responsibility and power over the liberty of the de-
fendant, would simply refuse to listen to arguments presented
to them in favor of acquittal, terminate discussion, and render
a verdict. On the contrary it is far more likely that a juror pre-
senting reasoned argument in favor of acquittal would either
have his arguments answered or would carry enough other ju-
rors with him to prevent conviction. A majority will cease
discussion and outvote a minority only after reasoned discus-
sion has ceased to have persuasive effect or to serve any other
purposes-when a minority, that is, continues to insist upon
acquittal without having persuasive reasons in support of its
position.
The Supreme Court majority, dismissing the defendants' fears
that minority factions would be ignored, placed its trust in the ma-
jority jurors to consider fully and reject the minority's views before
overriding their position.
In dissent, Justice Douglas was no better at relying on intuition,
proposing an alternative theory:
[N]onunanimous juries need not debate and deliberate as
fully as must unanimous juries. As soon as the requisite major-
ity is attained, further consideration is not required either by
Oregon or by Louisiana even though the dissident jurors
might, if given the chance, be able to convince the major-
ity.... It is said that there is no evidence that majority jurors
will refuse to listen to dissenters whose votes are unneeded for
conviction. Yet human experience teaches us that polite and
48. Id. See also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes injury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REv.
1261, 1265 (2000) (noting that the opinions were based "largely on intuition").
49. Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. at 356, 361 (1972).
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academic conversation is no substitute for the earnest and ro-
bust argument necessary to reach unanimity. 0
The unfortunate result of these opinions is not so much the debate
over which view of human nature is correct, but that the tendency
to speculate without any foundation in the empirical literature of
cognitive psychology has carried over to legal scholarship, particu-
larly in the realm of jury decision-making and the efficacy of the
unanimity requirement.
In the years following Apodaca and Johnson, from time to time,
there has been a flurry of publication activity addressing the con-
tinued desirability of the unanimity requirement, with advocates
on both sides making spurious and sweeping conclusions about
how people behave and make decisions as jurors.5' One scholar, for
example, citing only his own experience on a six-person jury,
boldly asserted that the extent of a particular juror's participation
in deliberations is dictated by "[i]ndividual personality traits" and
that "a majority-rule scheme would encourage [dissenting jurors]
to speak up more than a unanimity-rule scheme because they
would need to persuade fewer jurors to change the verdict." , 2 An-
other scholar, promoting the expansion of decision rules requiring
less than unanimity, has argued that unanimity no longer works as
well as in the past because "[e] ccentric jurors are undoubtedly not
so easily persuaded today to accept the majority view."53
50. Johnson, 406 U.S. at 388-89 (Douglas,J., dissenting).
51. See, e.g., Glasser, supra note 11; Kachmar, supra note 14; Morehead, supra note 10;
Osher, supra note 12. See also Akhil Reed Amar, ReinventingJuries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169 (1995) (advocating majority juries); Barbara A. Babcock, A Unani-
mous Jury is Fundamental to Our Democracy, 20 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 469 (1997); Richard H.
Menard, Jr., Ten Reasonable Men, 38 AM. CasM. L. REv. 179 (2001); Richard A. Primus, When
Democracy is Not Self-Government: Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for CriminalJuries, 18
CARDozo L. REv. 1417 (1997); Edward P. Schwartz & Warren E Schwartz, Decisionmatng by
Juries under Unanimity and Supermajority Voting Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 775 (1992) (utilizing the
assumptions of law and economics, but citing one psychological study only to the extent of
tracking rates for the occurrence of hung juries); Eugene R. Sullivan & Akhil R. Amar, Jury
Reform in America-A Return to the Old Country, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1141 (1996) (debating a
10-2 decision rule).
It is interesting to note that of the ten articles cited here addressing reform of the una-
nimity requirement, seven of them were published between 1996 and 1998-not
coincidentally in the aftermath of the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, whose verdict was an-
nounced in October 1995. The irony is that the O.J. Simpson jury, rightly or wrongly, was
unanimous in its verdict. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 48, at 1265-66, n.21 (noting how
critics of the unanimity rule seize "on moments of public outrage" to call for its elimina-
tion).
52. Glasser, supra note 11, at 674.
53. Morehead, supra note 10, at 944. Morehead concludes that "[e]liminating the re-
quirement of unanimity ... will do much to restore public confidence in our system of
justice." Id. at 945. This statement is without support or citation.
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Much of this debate has centered on the troublemaker status of
the holdout juror: the perception that one irrational juror (or
more) can prevent a unanimous verdict. 4 This trend in legal
scholarship in this area does little to advance the understanding of
the dynamics of the jury decision-making process, let alone provide
a basis for normative conclusions. Significant steps in legal scholar-
ship are required to bridge the widening gap between legal theory
and the social sciences, particularly by reference to the growing
body of relevant evidence and theories produced in the field of
cognitive psychology.55
3. Psychological Evidence Supporting
the Unanimity Decision Rule
Although it is not the purpose of this Article to discuss at length
the efficacy or reasonableness of the unanimity decision rule in
felony jury trials, it is worth a brief exploration of the literature in
order to demonstrate the dangers, as evident in Apodaca and John-
son, in relying too heavily on "common" assumptions about human
behavior. Although most psychological studies are based on labora-
tory conditions using mock juries, because of the high value placed
on the secrecy of jury deliberations, there is no other practical way
to acquire reliable data in a controlled environment.5 6 Comparing
empirical evidence to controlled studies of human behavior, in the
form of mock juries in particular, and interviews of actual jurors
post-verdict, provides the most complete picture of juror behavior
possible, while preserving the inherent secrecy of jury delibera-
tions.
The psychological evidence, in short, overwhelmingly lends
more credence to Justice Douglas's view of juror behavior than Jus-
tice White's view.5' The differences between the deliberation
processes of unanimous juries as compared to majority juries (of
54. Neilson & Winter, supra note 45, at 3. See a/SOJONAKAIT, supra note 30, at 98 (not-
ing that some scholars have expressed concern that deadlocked juries are increasingly
caused by an irrational juror who refuses to follow the law).
55. A notable and laudable exception to this trend is Kim Taylor-Thompson's article
defending the unanimity requirement as a means to respect the rights of jurors who are
female and/or racial minorities. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 48.
56. One scholar has commented that "although mock-jury studies may invite criticism,
it is difficult to imagine alternative, more accurate methodologies by which to assess jury
dynamics." Id. at 1272 n.67.
57. See Nemeth, supra note 46, at 55.
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varying acceptable ratios of decision) are "substantial."5" Juries op-
erating under a system with less than a rule of unanimity took less
time to reach a verdict, were less satisfied with the quality of the
deliberations, were less certain of the accuracy of their verdicts,
and were less influenced by the discussion during deliberations.59
In general, jurors deliberating under either eight of twelve or ten
of twelve decision rules "viewed deliberation as less thorough and
less serious," and regardless of whether there was any dissent, such
jury members "were less apt to agree on the verdict and on the is-
sues underlying the verdict."60 Such jurors tended to "discuss both
the law and evidence less," "recall less evidence," and were less
likely to correct their own mistakes about the evidence or the jury
instructions. 61 The minority faction members injuries operating on
a less-than-unanimity rule, in particular, "were especially likely to
believe that they had not had opportunity to express all their ar-
guments concerning the case."
62
Not only do unanimous juries take longer to reach a decision,
but, not surprisingly, they take more polls before reaching a ver-
dict.6 Jurors in the minority "participate with greater frequency
and are perceived as more influential in unanimous as compared
to majority rule juries."6 In at least two studies, jurors operating
under unanimity requirements shared more instances of agree-
ment and disagreement, and offered "more opinions and
information. 65 Jurors working towards unanimity "were more ef-
58. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 201.
59. Id. at 202. In addition, and critically, "[a] fter reaching their required quorum these
groups usually rejected the holdouts, terminated discussion, and returned a verdict within
just a few minutes." Id. See also HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 229
("[Jurors from both majority and holdout factions have lower respect for their fellow ju-
rors' open-mindedness and persuasiveness under the nonunanimous decision rules.");
Charlan Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority vs. Unanimity Decision
Rules, in IN THE JURY Box: CorROVERSIES IN THE COURTROOM 235, 252 (Lawrence S.
Wrightman et al. eds., 1987) (concluding that majority juries "do not reach consensus; they
are less effective in convincing all members of the appropriateness of the verdict; they do
not deliberate as long or as 'robust'; and they leave members with the feeling that justice has
not been administered").
60. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 82. Jurors, in general, held a
negative view of other jurors' "open-mindedness and persuasiveness" during deliberations.
Id. This lack of confidence in the verdict extends to members of the majority as well as the
minority.JONAKAIT, supra note 30, at 103.
61. JONAKAIT, supra note 30, at 103.
62. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 29. These scholars further note
that "[d]issenting viewpoints ... are at a relative disadvantage in non-unanimous juries as
compared to unanimous juries," thus affecting the "counterbalancing of viewpoints during
deliberation." Id. at 28.
63. Id. at 32.
64. Id.
65. Nemeth, supra note 46, at 53.
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fective in actually persuading their members that the final verdict
was the appropriate one," engaged in "more robust argument and
less polite conversation," and "tended to take longer to reach a
point where the verdict could be predicted. 6 ' They engage in a
more "thorough review of the evidence and generate authority and
finality for verdicts."67 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, two
economists have demonstrated that "when eventual verdicts are
considered, a unanimous jury rule tends to lead to more accurate
verdicts when compared to nonunanimous rules.,
68
Preeminent psychologists, who have extensively studied juries,
have concluded that "the unanimous rule appears preferable to
majority rules because of the importance of deliberation thor-
oughness, expression of individual viewpoints, and protection
against sampling variability effects of initial verdict preference."69
Two psychologists put it more starkly: "[T] he nonunanimous jury is
unacceptable. It weakens and inhibits jurors who are in the voting
minority; it breeds closed-mindedness; it impairs the quality of dis-
cussion; and it leaves many jurors unsatisfied with the final
verdict., 70 The fact that the federal criminal system and forty-eight
of the fifty states have retained the unanimity requirement for fel-
ony jury trials is a testament to this psychological evidence and,
perhaps, to tradition. Of course, the existence of the unanimous
decision rule that has become so ingrained in American society has
also produced another phenomenon: the holdoutjuror.
B. The Hung Jury
Juries required to deliberate to a unanimous verdict "do in fact
reach verbal consensus on a verdict"71 most of the time, but there
are times when one or more dissenters refuse to vote with the ma-
jority. This results in a hung jury. Psychologists have found that a
hung jury usually only occurs "when a substantial minority faction
66. Id. at 55. This might be true, in part, because "a large proportion of discussion oc-
curs during the interval between the largest faction reaching ten and the [unanimous]
verdict being rendered. This discussion usually includes several error corrections and refer-
ences to the standard of proof." HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 229.
67. JONAKAIT, supra note 30, at 96.
68. Neilson & Winter, supra note 45, at 3. This is true for both convictions and acquit-
tals. Id. at 6. They further note that "it is misleading to argue that nonunanimous verdicts
reduce the hung jury rate." Id. at 3.
69. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 229.
70. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 215.
71. SeeNemeth, supra note 46, at 53.
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existed at the start of deliberation, even though a minority of one
might hang the jury at the end of deliberation."" In one analysis of
hung juries, scholars found that three features of felony jury trials
affect the likelihood of a hung jury: "1) the evidentiary characteris-
tics of the case; 2) the interpersonal dynamics of deliberations; and
3) jurors' opinions about the fairness of the law as applied during
the trial.,
73
Despite the various reasons why a jury might become dead-
locked, the rate of occurrence of hung juries has, over time,
remained remarkably low and stable. Over thirty years ago, a survey
of over 3,500 state trials requiring unanimity found that the rate of
deadlock was 5.6%, with higher rates reported in major metropoli-
tan areas. A 1999 study found that between 1980 and 1997 federal
criminal hung jury rates were consistently between two percent and
three percent, while the average rate of hung juries in the state
courts of numerous large, urban areas was approximately six per-
cent.75 The widely accepted statistical average for the number of
criminal trial juries in the United States unable to reach unani-
mous verdicts is just over five percent, approximately the same as it
was over three decades ago.76
While the hung jury rate itself is not a cause for alarm, an analy-
sis of the empirical literature reveals significant reasons to be
concerned about protecting jurors who choose to dissent from the
majority in jury deliberations. Studies have shown that cases that
are considered to be relatively balanced are more likely to result in
hung juries, sometimes at a rate of up to ten percent.7 7 In one of
the only major studies of hung juries, twenty-four percent of them
were found to have deadlocked on votes of 11-1, with all of them
72. Id. at 27. Interestingly, in this particular study, a full twenty-five percent of the hung
juries studied were deadlocked with a lone dissenter at the end of deliberations. Id.
73. Paula L. Hannaford-Agor & Valerie P. Hans, Nullification at Work? A Glimpse from the
National Center for State Courts Study of Hung Juries, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1249, 1265-66
(2003).
74. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 16, at 461, 508. The rate of hung juries in New York
City was seven percent and in Los Angeles fifteen percent. Id. at 508.
75. Neilson & Winter, supra note 45, at 2. See also Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note
73, at 1252 (noting that some urban areas report deadlock rates in excess of ten percent). It
appears that California tends to experience a higher-than-average rate of hung juries, vary-
ing widely by county, with the federal hung jury rate, in particular, running twice the
national average. See Kachmar, supra note 14, at 295-96.
76. See Menard, supra note 51, at 179. Of course, the hungjury rate drops precipitously
if one considers that ninety-five percent of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargain. See
Stephanos Bibas, Regulating Local Variations in Federal Sentencing, 58 STAN. L. REv. 137, 145
(2005); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 48, at 1318-19.
77. JONAKAIT, supra note 30, at 100.
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breaking in favor of conviction s.7 These holdouts are not simply
"idiosyncratic" or irrational; the same research and subsequent
studies have indicated that deadlocks caused by holdouts usually
involved "a much larger number of dissenters at the outset of de-
liberations" and that these cases often reflect "genuine
disagreement over the weight of the evidence. 79
Although the occurrence of deadlocked juries has been called "a
practical failure of the jury," there are many psychologists and legal
scholars who believe that "the presence of some hung juries is a
desirable property of the jury institution."s° Over forty years ago,
one federal judge advanced a succinct defense of the deadlocked
jury: "[A] mistrial from a hung jury is a safeguard to liberty. In
many areas it is the sole means by which one or a few may stand
out against an overwhelming contemporary public sentiment.
Nothing should interfere with its exercise." 8' Prominent jury re-
searchers have concluded that the hung jury, which they call "the
jury system's most interesting phenomenon," is "a valued assurance
of integrity, since it can serve to protect the dissent of a minority."82
There is virtually universal acceptance of the unanimity rule of de-
cision for felony criminal jury trials and our society places a
historical and cultural value on its preservation. This, coupled with
the relatively significant occurrence of a minority of one among
the population of hung juries is persuasive evidence that the
criminal justice system should make a particular effort to address,
with sensitivity, the issues that arise during trial when a holdout ju-
ror has been identified during deliberations. As the next Part will
illustrate, however, trial and appellate courts on both the state and
federal levels are far from perfect in their efforts to preserve the
integrity of jury deliberations when the rights and interests of a
holdoutjuror are at stake.
78. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 16, at 460. The authors noted that in general, juries
break two-to-one for conviction every time. Id.
79. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 48, at 1317. One study in Los Angeles found that
over a three-year period, cases that were re-tried after a hung jury split eleven-to-one for
conviction resulted in a second deadlocked jury twenty-three percent of the time. JONAKAIT,
supra note 30, at 101-02.
80. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 232.
81. Huffman v. United States, 297 E2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (BrownJ., dissenting)
(rejecting the majority's holding that the trial court's delivery of an A//en charge was appro-
priate).
82. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 16, at 453.
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II. THE FAILURE TO PROTECT THE HOLDOUTJUROR
"Everyone has a breaking point. "
-Juror in 12 Angry Men
3
The jury deliberation room is often no place for the faint of
heart. It can be a brutalizing environment in which strangers say
things to each other that they would never dream of saying to
someone they know on more than a transitory basis.84 In most
cases, however, the identification of a holdout juror is accompa-
nied by allegations of misconduct, refusals to deliberate, or other
behavior opposed by the overwhelming majority of the jury.85
Before proceeding to an analysis of the psychology of the hold-
out juror, this Part examines a sample of cases, reviewed by federal
and state appellate courts, where trial judges addressed issues dur-
ing jury deliberations surrounding the existence of a dissenting
juror. These examples, far from unusual, demonstrate that trial
courts vary widely in the extent to which they delve into the delib-
eration process, ranging from a practice of protecting the sanctity
of the jury to instances that can only be interpreted as overt coer-
cion.s6 In many of these cases, the holdout juror is further isolated,
83. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
84. See Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in Jury Re-
form, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 133, 151 n.68 (1996) (detailing several anecdotes of high
emotions during jury deliberations). During one Las Vegas murder trial, in which the fore-
man accused the lone holdout of, among other things, glaring at him, the defense attorney
replied: "Hell, in jury deliberation they do more than glare. They yell, scream, [and]
shout .... It's none of your business or my business." Peter O'Connell, Rudin juror, foreman at
odds, LAs VEGAS REv.-J. ONLINE EDITION, May 2, 2001, http://www.reviewjournal.com/
lvrjhome/2001/May-02-Wed-2001/news/16003473.html (last visited on Nov. 11, 2006) (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform). The judge left the holdout on the
jury, and the jury returned a guilty verdict the next day. Peter O'Connell, Rudin Verdict: Guilty of
Murder, LAs VEGAS REv.-J. ONLINE EDITION, May 3, 2001, http://www.reviewjournal.com/
lvrhome/2001/May-03-Thu-2001/news/16013338.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2006) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
85. See O'Connell supra note 84. See also infra Part II.A.
86. In at least one case, a holdout juror was held in criminal contempt for not disclos-
ing in the jury selection process an eleven-year-old conviction for possession of LSD. See
People v. Kriho, 996 P.2d 158 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (reversing for a new trial on the crimi-
nal contempt charge because evidence of jury deliberations was improperly admitted);
National Drug Strategy Network, Holdout Juror in Drug Case, Laura Kriho, Found in Contempt of
Court, Fined $1200, Mar.-Apr. 1997, http://www.ndsn.org/marapr97/kriho.html (last visited
Nov. 11, 2006) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform). The District
Attorney, after the reversal, dismissed the case. State's Mot. & Order to Dismiss the Case,




castigated, or even removed altogether from the deliberation
87process.
A. The Worst of the Worst
In 2001, the California Supreme Court developed a standard for
addressing the conditions under which a juror could be removed
from deliberations. In People v. Cleveland,s8 during the second day of
deliberations, the jury in a robbery case returned a note to the trial
court requesting that one juror be replaced because that juror
"[did] not agree with the charge and [did] not show a willingness
to apply the law." 9 The trial court decided to interview the foreper-
son extensively, and then called the entire jury into the courtroom,
asking it whether anyone felt "that any other juror or jurors ...
[were] not deliberating, [or were] not considering others' opin-
ions, [and had] foreclosed discussion." 90  After ten jurors
responded affirmatively, the trial court decided to interview each
juror individually, without the presence of the other jurors." The
court interviewed the allegedly offending juror last, who stated that
he was engaging in the deliberation process and that he had "no
problem with the law. [He] only [had] problems with the facts as
[he] perceive[d] them. 92 The trial court, concluding that the juror
was not adequately deliberating with his fellow jurors, dismissed
him and seated an alternate juror.93 The jury returned a guilty ver-
dict two hours later.94
Recognizing that "not every incident involving a juror's conduct
requires or warrants further investigation,"9 5 the California Su-
preme Court reversed the conviction, holding that a trial court
may remove a juror from deliberations if "it appears as a 'demon-
',96
strable reality' that the juror is unable or unwilling to deliberate.
87. It is important to note at the outset of this survey of cases that the only cases that
are appealed in this context are those that result in conviction. The prosecution cannot
appeal a verdict resulting in acquittal. United States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185, 192 (3d Cir.
2001). Therefore, the holdout juror orjurors in these cases were, in every case, holding out
for acquittal.
88. People v. Cleveland, 21 P.3d 1225 (Cal. 2001).
89. Id. at 1227-28.
90. Id. at 1228.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1229.
93. Id. at 1229-30.
94. Id. at 1230.
95. Id. at 1233.
96. Id. at 1237 (citations omitted).
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In this case, the court held that the interviews of the jurors did not
reveal the holdout's refusal to deliberate to a "demonstrable real-
ity," particularly since there had been at least a day of deliberations
without complaint.97 Nevertheless, the court did not explain fur-
ther what constitutes a "demonstrable reality" or the justification
for removing a holdout juror who had stopped deliberating be-
cause the dissenter's arguments no longer had any persuasive force
on the majority.98 Further, the court did not address in any mean-
ingful way the inherently coercive effect that interviewing the
entire panel of jurors individually would have had on the course of
deliberations had the trial court decided not to remove the dis-
senter from the panel.
These unanswered questions would appear again in the Califor-
nia courts later the same year in People v. Hightower,"9 a case
addressed by the California Court of Appeal after Cleveland. In
Hightower, during the third day of the jury's deliberations, the trial
court in a murder case received two notes from the jury reporting
that one juror was refusing to follow the court's instructions by bas-
ing discussions on "feelings, suppositions, and unreasonable
interpretations of the evidence."100 The court questioned the fore-
person with counsel present. The foreperson identified the
holdout, describing the juror as "Vietnamese.""" The court then
questioned the holdout juror, who reported that he was deliberat-
ing, following the court's instructions, and subject to "a lot of
pressure" and "a lot of personal attack" in deliberations. 2 After
interviewing each of the other ten jurors individually, the trial
court removed the holdout juror for misconduct and seated an
alternate on the jury, which then returned a guilty verdict two
hours later.
0 3
The California Court of Appeal, noting that it could not "say
that the trial court conducted an unnecessarily intrusive inquiry,"
held that there was "no violation by the trial court of the principles
announced and reaffirmed in Cleveland."10 4 This opinion, however,
97. See id. at 1238.
98. Id.; see also Gina Duwe, Jury Convicts Man in Agent's Killing, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL
ONLINE, July 26, 2005, http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=344006 (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (reporting that trial court in murder
case removed holdout juror who sent a note "declining to deliberate further" following
pressure from other jurors to the extent that she became ill).
99. People v. Hightower, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 680 (Ct. App. 2001).
100. Id. at 683.
101. Id. at 684.
102. Id. at 686.
103. Id. at 687-88, 699 (KayJ., dissenting).
104. Id. at 692-93.
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was issued over a strong dissent which noted that, as in Cleveland,
this jury reported no difficulty with the holdout juror except "after
a substantial period of deliberation, when [the holdout] was, as he
put it under pressure."'0 5 The dissent, albeit without referring to
any empirical psychological evidence, insightfully noted that:
Someone in [the holdout's] position, who feels that he can-
not articulate his views as well as the other jurors and is being
told by otherjurors that he does not belong on the jury might
be expected to begin agreeing with them, and might even go
so far as to claim that he did not know what he was getting
into when he originally said he could be fair and impartial.
He should not be disqualified for making such statements be-
cause they are reflective of duress, not bias, under the
circumstances. 1
06
Finding no substantive difference between the holdout juror in
this case and the one in Cleveland, the dissent would have reversed
the conviction "because the interrogation of the entire jury during
deliberations effectively coerced the verdicts."1 7 The dissent con-
cluded that while "there are no bright-line rules dictating when an
investigation must cease, . .. it was prejudicial error to continue to
relentlessly question every juror in this case about what was wrong
with the lone holdout for an acquittal."0 8 As this Article later ar-
gues,. this is precisely the type of case where there should be a
bright-line rule preventing such an intrusive inquiry when a juror
holding out against an overwhelming majority has been identified.
105. Id. at 696 (KayJ., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 698 (KayJ., dissenting).
108. Id.
Unfortunately, the decision in Cleveland has remained the law in California. In People v.
Metters, No. A074986, 2002 WL 31106404 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2002), the California Court
of Appeal affirmed a robbery conviction in a case where the trial court removed the holdout
juror after the juror refused to deliberate further, telling the court that "I have come to a
conclusion which is different from my fellowjurors." Id. at *6.
The dissent, noting that there were several alternatives available to the trial court, would
have reversed because the court "undertook an egregiously intrusive inquiry into the sub-
stance of the jury's deliberations and the thought processes of individual jurors." Id. at * 17
(Kline, P.J., dissenting). Following the holdout's removal, the jury returned a guilty verdict
in fifteen minutes. Id. The dissent concluded that the other jurors must have noticed that
the removal of the holdout "was rooted in her unwillingness to submit to the other jurors'
view of the case." Id. at *31 (Kline, P.J., dissenting). This insight correctly identifies not only
the effect on the holdout juror by an intrusive inquiry by the trial court, but also the effect
on the rest of the jury upon the resumption of deliberations.
109. See infra Part IV.
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These cases are not confined to California. In West v. State,"' a
Georgia trial court in a cocaine possession case received three
notes from the jury during deliberations, one of which stated that
one juror thought an undercover police officer who lied on duty
was committing entrapment."' The trial court delivered a supple-
mental instruction explaining that the entirety of the law and the
facts had been previously given to the jury, and declined to give a
further instruction on entrapment.'1 The next day, however, after
returning to the courtroom, the foreperson reported to the court
that there was a holdout juror who refused to vote to convict or
"listen to the evidence" because "he was bothered by [the officer's]
denial that he was a police officer and believed that all cops were
liars."' 13 In the presence of the entire jury, the trial court then iden-
tified the holdout juror and questioned that juror at length. 1 4 The
juror replied that "he simply did not think that the state had
proven its case," after which other jurors commented on the hold-
outjuror and the duties of an undercover officer."
5
Following what was, in effect, the jury deliberating in front of
the court and counsel, the court instructed the jury that entrap-
ment was "not applicable to this case," and the jury returned a
guilty verdict fifteen minutes later."16 Without addressing the obvi-
ously coercive nature of the trial court's intrusion into the
deliberations of the jury, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction, finding "no error as [the trial court] did not inti-
mate an opinion as to [the defendant's] guilt or innocence or
improperly comment on the evidence."1'7
110. West v. State, 606 S.E.2d 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
111. Id. at 102.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 103.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 103.
117. Id. at 104. This is not the only case of this type from the Georgia state courts. See,
e.g., Thompson v. State, 581 S.E.2d 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming the trial court's re-
moval of the holdout juror who had been seen talking with an alternative juror who had
previous contact with a known convicted drug felon, despite the holdout juror's claims that
they had only discussed travel arrangements to court); Mason v. State, 535 S.E.2d 497 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2000) (reversing conviction on charges of rape and child molestation where trial
court received a note from the holdout juror after three days of deliberations and the deliv-
ery of an A//en charge asking that deliberations be ended, because the trial court questioned
the holdout in front of the entire jury, refused to declare a mistrial after the holdout stated
that she did not believe her opinion about the case would change, and had not disclosed to
defense counsel an initial note from the foreperson requesting that the holdout be replaced).
See also United States v. Kemp, No. CRIM. A. 04-370-02, 2005 WL 1006348 (E.D. Pa. April 28,
2005) (involving the removal of a holdoutjuror, after substantial inquiry by the trial court, who
expressed a view that she was unlikely to believe FBI agents' testimony, despite the holdout's
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In Braxton v. United States,1 8 ajuror sent a note to the trial court
several hours into deliberations indicating that another juror had
made a statement during deliberations that "most police are li-
ars."" 9 The trial court, after instructing the jury at length about the
'"jurors' duty to follow the law" and the court's instructions, effec-
tively targeted the holdout juror by instructing the foreperson in
front of the entire jury to "let [the judge] know in writing whether
any juror is refusing to follow the court's instructions."'' ° The next
day, the court received three notes from three different jurors,
identifying a juror who they believed held some preconceived be-
liefs against the police. 12' The court decided to question the
foreperson in the presence of counsel, who stated that the holdout
juror had "[e]xperiences outside of the courtroom" that affected
the juror's "assessment of the evidence.'1 However, he also ac-
knowledged that it was difficult to explain how the juror was
refusing to follow the court's instructions. Referring to the holdout
as the "offending juror," the trial court declined to interview him
and dismissed him, after instructing the foreperson to walk into
the jury room with the courtroom clerk and, in the presence of the
other jurors, "point out" the holdout.2 3 Not surprisingly, "almost
immediately" after he was removed, the jury returned a guilty ver-
dict.
2 4
The D.C. Court of Appeals recognized that it was "readily appar-
ent" that the dismissed juror was a holdout, but nevertheless
affirmed the conviction. The court noted that "any error in not
interviewing [the holdout juror] was invited" because the defen-
dant's attorney consistently objected to any judicial inquiry of any
of the jurors once it had been identified that there was a holdout.
2 6
Noting that the only pieces of evidence before it were the uncon-
tradicted notes from the disgruntled jurors, and that "the evidence
of juror misconduct was less than overwhelming," the appeals
court determined that it was nevertheless "constrained to sustain
denial of such bias); United States v. Kemp, 379 F Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (denying de-
fense motion for judgment of acquittal).
118. Braxton v. United States, 852 A.2d 941 (D.C. 2004).
119. Id. at 943-44.
120. Id. at 944.
121. Id. at 944-45.
122. Id. at 945.
123. Id. at 946.
124. Id.
125. Id. at947.
126. Id. at 948.
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the judge's decision to dismiss this juror.',2 7 In a footnote, the ap-
peals court suggested that the proper course of action by the trial
court should have been to declare a mistrial, but it refused to ad-
dress that issue in the opinion because "counsel ha[d] not raised
on appeal the issue."2
Despite the general understanding that jury deliberations can be
unpleasant places where equally unpleasant speech is occasionally
used, at least one court has removed a juror for using such speech.
In Arnold v. State,9 the trial court received a series of notes indicat-
ing that the jury was deadlocked at 10-2, one of which stated: "Any
juror[,] especially the foreman[,] who tells another juror to go to
hell should be removed!"1 30 The court interviewed the foreperson,
who did not specifically recall making the statement, but noted
that there had been a "heated argument" during deliberations.
The foreperson gave the impression that he was one of the two
holdout jurors for acquittal. 3 2 Calling the situation "unsalvage-
able," the trial court questioned the foreperson in front of the
entire jury panel about the state of the deadlock.33 During the in-
quiry, another juror interjected, asking the court whether a juror
could be dismissed for "using curse words" and calling jurors
"monkeys.",3 4 The trial court responded that such conduct was "to-
tally inappropriate" and that "some action could possibly be taken
in that regard."' 35 The trial court then excused the jury, and dis-
missed the foreperson from the jury "based solely on his use of
vulgar and disparaging language.',3 6 Sixteen minutes later, after the
complaining juror became the new foreperson, the jury returned a
guilty verdict. 
137
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding
that "the trial court abused its discretion in removing the jury
foreman based solely on his use of offensive language during
heated jury deliberations."' 3 While the court likely reached the
right result in this case, it missed a much larger point about the
trial court's method of inquiry. After learning that the vote was
127. Id. at 948-49.
128. Id. at949n.10.
129. Arnold v. State, 617 S.E.2d 169 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
130. Id. at 172. It is unclear from the record how the trial court learned the deadlock
was 10-2. Id. at n.1
131. Id. at 173.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 173-74.
134. Id. at 174.
135. Id. at 174 n.4.
136. Id. at 174 (internal quotation marks omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 175.
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split 10-2 in favor of conviction and that the foreperson was one of
the holdouts, the trial court questioned the foreperson in the
presence of the entire jury panel, which of course included the
other holdout. After the complaining juror spoke up out of turn,
the court excused the jury and dismissed the foreperson, leaving
the other dissenter alone against the overwhelming remaining ma-
jority. It is not at all surprising that it took a mere sixteen minutes
and the ascension of the complaining juror to the status of fore-
person for the remaining holdout to accede to the will of the
majority. The appeals court failed to address the effect that this
obviously coercive process had on the remaining holdout juror
who, it is clear, quickly capitulated.3 9
B. Cases Moving Towards a Middle Ground
Although many of the cases described in the preceding Part il-
lustrate examples of trial court judges engaging in arguably
coercive behavior in order to obtain a unanimous verdict, the
situation today is certainly not as bad as history would suggest.
Some courts have taken steps to develop a middle ground that rec-
ognizes the inherently coercive impact of excessive investigation by
the trial court when allegations of juror misbehavior arise. Unfor-
tunately the practice of making grand assumptions about the
nature of jury deliberations persists, and such assumptions do not
fully account for the complexity of the problem.
In People v. Foreman,'O an Illinois trial court received a note from
the jury after several hours of deliberation indicating that one juror
139. There are a number of cases where appeals courts have reversed convictions after
trial courts have obviously improperly influenced or, in some cases, coerced the jury into
reaching a verdict. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1988) (reversing
conviction after the trial court removed the holdout for acquittal after four days of delibera-
tions, when the holdout admitted to throwing water at another juror, because the trial court
excessively questioned the holdout juror individually, removed the juror after praising the
entire jury panel for their efforts to persuade the holdout to vote to convict, and stated that
thousands of dollars would be wasted by a mistrial); People v. Branch, 462 N.E.2d 868, 872-
74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (reversing a murder conviction where the trial court received a note
from the jury identifying one holdout for acquittal who had stated that no one should go to
jail, because the trial court subsequently told the jury that the holdout "should not have
received jury service" and it would arrange overnight accommodations within the hour,
resulting in a unanimous guilty verdict ten minutes later); State v. Johnson, 105 P.3d 85
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing a murder conviction after the trial court removed the
holdout for acquittal after four days of deliberations, following a determination that the
foreperson was credible in testifying that the holdout was excessively emotional, impeding
deliberations, and had often retreated to a corner of the jury room).
140. People v. Foreman, 836 N.E.2d 750 (Il. Ct. App. 2005).
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refused to agree to a guilty verdict "even if she believed that [the]
defendant was guilty."14 After the trial court directed the jury to
continue deliberations, the jury sent another note thirty minutes
later indicating that the holdout juror "objected to returning a
verdict under any circumstances because of religious beliefs."
42
The court then instructed the entire jury that "no one ... [was]
being asked to pass judgment upon anyone," concluding that "if
anybody [thought] that they [were] being asked to judge someone
they [were] mistaken.' 43 About an hour after the instruction, the
jury delivered a guilty verdict.14 The Illinois Court of Appeals af-
firmed the conviction, holding that the trial court's supplemental
instruction was not coercive, but rather "clarified and instructed
the holdoutjuror on her duties and responsibilities as ajuror.'
45
141. Id. at 764.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 764-65.
144. Id. at 765.
145. Id. For an example of a trial court that engaged in extensive inquiry into the delib-
eration process, but ultimately correctly declared a mistrial, see United States v. McIntosh, 380
F.3d 548 (1st Cir. 2004). In McIntosh, the district court learned during deliberations that
there was a holdout for acquittal who declared his mind made up and who refused to devi-
ate from his position. Id. at 551. The court, reluctantly and only at the suggestion of the jury,
interviewed the holdout juror, who claimed that his verdict was based on the evidence and
that he made up his mind only after deliberations had begun. Id. at 551-52. Following a
later note from the jury indicating another deadlock, the prosecutor informed the court
that a criminal background check of the holdout juror revealed a number of arrests during
the preceding ten years, suggesting that the juror had not been truthful during jury selec-
tion. Id. at 552. The court again questioned the juror and determined that because none of
the arrests had resulted in a felony conviction, the juror was not ineligible to serve on the
jury. Id. The court then declared a mistrial due to a hung jury. Id. The appeals court af-
firmed, finding "ample evidence in the record to support the district court's decision not to
jettison [the holdout juror]." Id. at 556. The trial court should never permit the target of a
juror's complaint to also become the target of a zealous prosecutor who decides to further
investigate the background of a dissenting juror during jury deliberations. On occasion, the
prosecutor's subsequent investigation of a suspected dissenting juror has created additional
issues often not relevant to the subject of the jury's note at all. See, e.g., Sanders v. Lamarque,
357 F.3d 943, 944 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the trial court improperly removed the lone
holdout juror based on, among other things, information discovered by the prosecutor
during deliberations, noting that "[r]emoval of a holdout juror is the ultimate form of coer-
cion"); People v. Gallano, 821 N.E.2d 1214, 1221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (addressing
information revealed by a prosecutor's background check of ajuror after the juror sent out
a note during deliberations that he could not sign a guilty verdict "because [he felt] some
reasonable doubt"). A prosecutor who investigates the criminal or other background of a
juror after deliberations have begun is simply not doing her job. The time to conduct crimi-
nal history checks of prospective jurors is at the beginning of the trial duringjury selection,
not at the end of the trial. Such a background check during deliberations reveals the prose-
cutor's obvious motive to convince the court to remove a juror who has turned out to be
unfavorable to the prosecution's case. This late-acquired information should never be used
to dismiss ajuror who has been identified as a dissenter.
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In United States v. Geffrard,146 the district court received a letter
from one of the jurors during deliberations "identify[ing] herself
as a person having religious beliefs based on the teachings of
Emanuel Swedenborg."04' The letter explained that the juror could
not "live with a verdict of guilty for any of the defendants on any of
the charges because of her beliefs deep within her heart and
soul.' 148 Among other things, the juror explained that she believed
the facts indicated entrapment even though the jury had been in-
structed previously that entrapment was not a defense in the case.
She also stated that she viewed the rest of the jury "with intellectual
contempt as being unable to understand the teachings of Sweden-
borg.", 49 The court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision
to remove the juror on its own motion without further judicial in-
quiry,"5° noting that "the judge declined with good reason to get
into a likely unproductive discussion with ajuror about that juror's
deeply held religious beliefs at odds with criminal procedure."'' A
mistrial could have created issues involving double jeopardy and
the replacement of the excused juror by an alternate was disfa-
vored after deliberations had begun. As such, the court of appeals
concluded that the district court exercised sound discretion in de-
clining to engage in a discourse with the holdout juror when the
contents of the juror's letter clearly indicated her intent.1 52 This
case, better than most, demonstrates a careful trial court that bal-
anced the necessity of removing a juror who could not deliberate
properly with the interest in protecting the integrity of the delib-
erative process without judicial interference.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is one of the
most protective courts when it comes to the treatment of holdout
jurors by trial courts. In the groundbreaking case of United States v.
Symington,15 3 the jury had deliberated for seven days on twenty-one
criminal counts before the trial court received a note indicating
that there was a lone holdout.154 Four days later, the jury sent
146. United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448 (11th Cir. 1996).
147. Id. at 451.
148. Id. A transcript of the entire letter is contained at the end of the appellate court's
opinion. See id. at 453-54.
149. Id. at 451-52.
150. The jury returned a unanimous verdict from its eleven remaining members, a pro-
cedure permissible under federal criminal procedure. See id.; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b).
151. Geffrard, 87 F.3d at 452.
152. Id.
153. United States v. Symington, 195 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 1999).
154. Id. at 1083. The note alleged that the juror had made a final decision before re-
viewing all of the counts. Id.
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another note stating that the holdout, an elderly woman, refused
to continue discussing the case, citing various examples of her
refusal to participate. '5s The trial court then conducted individual
interviews with each jury member to assess the problem, with each
of the majority jurors suggesting that the holdout be dismissed,
though some of them expressed the view that "their frustration ...
may have derived more from their disagreement with her on the
merits of the case."156
After all of the majority jurors had been interviewed individually,
the trial court interviewed the holdout, who claimed that she was
willing to continue deliberating, but complained about pressure
she was feeling from the other jurors: "I found myself backed up
against the wall for a vote every time [there was] an objection to
my vote on a specific count or an element of the count .... I real-
ized that I was the one isolated.' 57 She professed a willingness "to
discuss the elements of the case with the other jurors," but told the
court that "she became intimidated when everyone talked at once
and demanded that she justify her views as soon as she, stated
them."'' " After the interview was completed, the trial court dis-
missed the holdout juror "for just cause for being either unwilling
or unable to participate in the deliberative process in accordance
with the instructions of the Court.'
59
The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that
if the record evidence discloses any reasonable possibility that
the impetus for ajuror's dismissal stems from the juror's views
on the merits of the case, the court must not dismiss the juror.
Under such circumstances, the trial judge has only two op-
tions: send the jury back to continue deliberating or declare a
mistrial.160
Although this rule is among the most protective of the interests of
holdout jurors, it created a situation where the integrity of the
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1083-84.
157. Id. at 1084. This inquiry generated 101 pages of transcript. Id. at 1097 (Fitzgerald,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158. Id. at 1084.
159. Id. Several days later, the jury, reconstituted with an alternate juror, returned a
guilty verdict on seven counts, acquitted on three counts, and hung on the remaining
counts. Id.
160. Id. at 1087 (emphasis in original). See also Sanders v. Lamarque, 357 F.3d 943, 948
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that, after the state trial court extensively inquired into the jury's
deliberation process, "the trial court committed constitutional error when, after learning




jury's deliberations is easily compromised. By framing the question
before the court as "what evidentiary standard the district court
ought to employ" to determine whether a holdout juror should be
removed,'"' the court revealed a major flaw in its reasoning. A
higher standard-one which the court ultimately adopted-leads
to trial courts committing a greater intrusion into the jury's delib-
eration process in order to find adequate evidence to support a
decision on removal.
In Symington, for example, the trial court conducted an extensive
examination of each individual juror to determine the scope and
nature of the deliberation problem. Viewed from the perspective
of the holdout, however, the entire jury sat in the jury room while
the holdout juror watched as her colleagues were individually
questioned outside of her presence about her conduct in delibera-
tions. Knowing that eleven members of a majority opposed to her
views had just told the judge everything that she had been doing
wrong, by the time it was her turn to be interviewed, it mattered
very little what she actually said. There was no conceivable way the
trial court could leave that juror on the panel without the specter
of coercion having been imposed by the very nature of the judicial
inquiry.
The Symington court recognized this dilemma, and acknowl-
edged the important fact that a trial judge "must not compromise
the secrecy of jury deliberations."6 2 The court further noted, how-
ever, that the value placed on secrecy means that "a trial judge may
not be able to determine conclusively whether or not a juror's al-
leged inability or unwillingness to deliberate is simply a reflection
of the juror's opinion on the merits of the case, an opinion that
may be at odds with those of her fellow jurors.' ' 16 3 Finally, the court
recognized the tension created in its standard by noting that "pro-
hibit [ing] juror dismissal unless there is no possibility at all that the
juror was dismissed because of her position on the merits may be
to prohibit dismissal in all cases. '" The court did not acknowledge
that having a standard for dismissal in this context in the first place
necessitates judicial inquiry into the deliberation process. It is pre-
cisely for this reason that, as will be explained further below, any
judicial inquiry into the course of deliberations, once they have
started and once a holdout juror has emerged, necessarily imposes a
taint on the integrity of both the jury and the deliberation process.
161. Symington, 195 .3d at 1086.
162. Id. at 1086.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1087 n.5.
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This detrimentally affects the holdout juror, regardless of the rea-
sons for dissent.
III. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE HOLDOUTJUROR
This Part will discuss the thought processes of the holdout juror
and how they are different from jurors who enjoy membership in
the majority. To accomplish this goal, it is necessary to bridge the
considerable gulf that exists between legal scholarship and empiri-
cal psychology by articulating a psychological context within which
the question of the protection of the holdout status can be ana-
lyzed. This journey through the annals of cognitive psychology
does not attempt to align itself with the valuable contributions pre-
viously made to legal scholarship by the law and economics
paradigm. The legal terrain describing the intersection between
legal theory and economic principles is well worn. Instead of de-
scribing the psychology of the holdout juror exclusively in the
context of a normative or prescriptive framework, this Part will dis-
cuss the limits of the prescriptive model of decision-making in this
context, and then offer a descriptive model of juror decision-
making that emphasizes the uniqueness of the holdout's position
relative to other jurors and the particular psychological forces at
work on a holdout juror.
One article recently asked: "Why has the law and economics tra-
dition been so influential, and mainstream social and cognitive
psychology relatively ignored, in modern legal scholarship?" 165 One
answer might be that in legal scholarship, there is a heavy emphasis
on prescriptive solutions to problems of decision while cognitive
psychology provides a more descriptive model for how people ac-
tually behave. Indeed, law and economics addresses "decision
making by constructing axiomatic models that describe the market
forces at work in particular circumstances and that prescribe ap-
propriate actions in light of the assumptions underlying the
models.' 66 The emphasis is "on prescribing what should be done
rather than on describing what decision makers actually do and
certainly not on diagnosis or implementation."' 6 For law and eco-
nomics scholars, the individual's behavior is "evaluated in light of
165. Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 22, at 1081.





how well it conform [s] to the prescriptive models rather than the
other way around.'
68
Students of cognitive psychology and organizational behavior
approach the analysis of decision-making in a different manner.
The psychological approach is much more "interested in the inter-
play of group and institutional dynamics and their effects on the
decisions made within and on the behalf of organizations;" in
other words, how decision-makers use information to arrive at deci-
sions. 69 It is important in this analysis, therefore, to acknowledge
the "important truism of social psychology ... that people respond
not to some objective reality but to their own subjective interpreta-
tions or definitions of that reality."7 ° As other authors have
recognized, this truism generates two relevant insights to legal
analysis: 1) "[D] ifferences in judgment may reflect differences in
the way a given issue or object of judgment is being perceived and
construed rather than a difference in the perceivers' values or per-
sonality traits," and 2) "[S]uccessful persuasion," particularly of a
holdout juror, "involves a change not in people's underlying values
or beliefs about the just response to a given set of facts and circum-
stances but rather a change in the way they interpret those facts
and circumstances and assimilate that information to their own
pre-existing beliefs and life experiences." 7' As will be seen below,
these insights have tremendous value to the analysis of the holdout
juror. To begin the analysis, however, a brief side trip into a well-
known prescriptive model of decision-making will provide the
foundation for the descriptive analysis that follows.
A. A Prescriptive Model of the Holdout Juror
"It's always difficult to keep personal prejudice out of a thing like
this."
-Henry Fonda in 12 Angry Men
72
The analysis of the holdout juror as a rational actor requires a
number of assumptions. The first and most important assumption
168. See id. at 6. "Behavior that conformed to the models was judged to be rational, and
behavior that did not conform to the models was judged to be irrational." Id.
169. Id.
170. Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 22, at 1088.
171. Id.
172. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
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is that the holdout juror is, in fact, a rational individual, meaning,
in the classic normative decision theory context, that the holdout
juror will seek to do "what is best.'7 3 In basic terms, this means
choosing the option that offers the biggest payoff, whatever that
means in context, and can include minimizing loss. 7 4 It is further
assumed that a jury operates as a single-play game. 75 In other
words, it can be assumed for this hypothetical construct that ajury
of twelve people will not be composed in precisely the same way at
any time in the future and asked to decide another case. While it is
certainly true that a person could serve on a jury a number of
times during his or her life, it is highly unlikely that the juror
would ever again see the same eleven faces in the jury room during
deliberations. As a result, hurt feelings simply do not matter as
much-to the holdout juror or, for that matter, to the members of
the majority.
Once the assumptions are established, the illustration of the
"game," as game theorists put it, can occur. Depending on the na-
ture of the decision, a payoff matrix is constructed in the context of
either a single decision or a double-dependent decision. One
scholar, for example, in analyzing juror decision-making where the
focal point was the decision of one member of the jury panel, de-
picted a double decision: first, the defendant decides whether or not
to commit the crime, and then the juror subsequently decides
whether or not to convict.176 In an alternative model of a decision,
another scholar has used a single-player matrix to examine the diffi-
cult decision of Shakespeare's Hamlet of whether or not to believe
the ghost of his father and kill the king. 77 Hamlet first has to decide
whether or not to believe his father's ghost, the former king, who
claims he was murdered by his uncle, the current king. 78 If he be-
lieves the ghost, he must kill the king to fulfill his duty as the former
173. See BEACH, supra note 166, at 66.
174. Id.
175. See Primus, supra note 51, at 1423 n.21 (describing juries as "one-shotters" as op-
posed to administrative bodies which experience repeated interaction and opportunities for
decision).
176. Ehud Kalai, A Rational Game Theory Framework for the Analysis of Legal and Criminal
Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 235,
235-37 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). This matrix is unusual because it targets the decision of the
person that occurs second in the sequence of decisions. Kalai acknowledges that this is a
critical weakness in the analysis. Id. at 239. Under traditional game theory analysis, the deci-
sion-maker chooses a course of action leading to some uncertain outcome. In this case, the
act to be judged has already occurred and the decision will lead to a certain outcome: con-
viction or acquittal. Id.
177. John Orbell, Hamlet and the Psychology of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 5 RA-
TIONALITY & SOCIETY 127, 130 (1993).
178. Id. at 129.
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king's son; if he does not believe the ghost, he must not kill the cur-
rent king."9 Whether or not the ghost is telling the truth provides
the other variable in the decision matrix and leads to the range of
consequences for being correct or incorrect in his decision.80
To illustrate the payoff matrix and decision faced by the holdout
juror, the single-player matrix of Hamlet's example is the better
fit.'8 ' In order to achieve the status of a holdout juror, the juror
must be a member of a jury panel that has reached an 11-1 deci-
sion, either to convict or to acquit. For this rational-actor analysis,
it will be assumed that the jury is split in favor of conviction, al-
though the analysis is the same in either direction. The holdout for
acquittal has two choices, one of which must be taken: vote to con-
vict, thereby cooperating with the majority; or vote to acquit,
thereby causing a hungjury.82 Like the ghost in Hamlet, there are
then two possible states of affairs: either the majority is correct and
the defendant is actually guilty, or the majority is incorrect and the
defendant is actually innocent.'8 3 The problem for the holdout ju-
ror is thus illustrated in Figure 1.
FIGURE 1
THE CHOICES OF THE HOLDOUT JUROR
AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
MAJORITY CORRECT MAJORITY INCORRECT
D ACTUALLY GUILTY D ACTUALLY INNOCENT
CONVICTION CONVICTION
Vote To Convict




CRIMINAL GOES FREE INNOCENT GOES FREE
C D
179. Id.
180. Id. at 129-30.
181. The analysis could proceed, as in the game theory analysis of juror decision-
making, with two participants: the defendant and the juror. However, because this Article
seeks to isolate the decision-making process of the holdout, as opposed to the entire jury,
the defendant is not a player in the holdout's game. Likewise, it matters little what the ma-
jority of the jury does; all power over the outcome at the point the jury is divided 11-1 is
assumed to be in the hands of the holdoutjuror.
182. For this analysis, it will be assumed that a case that results in a hung jury will not be
later re-tried. The defendant in such cases will go free.
183. This analysis necessarily puts aside for the moment the fine legal distinction be-
tween "innocent" and "not guilty."
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"We have nothing to gain or lose by our verdict."
-Henry Fonda in 12 Angry Men1
4
After the decision options are clearly defined and the conse-
quences are identified, the next step is to determine the relative
preferences of the holdout juror for each of the possible outcomes.
The most preferred outcome in this context is that the innocent
defendant avoids being wrongly convicted and, as a result, goes
free. By contrast, the worst outcome is for the innocent defendant
to be wrongly convicted and punished.1 8 5 The other two outcomes,
convicting the guilty defendant and letting the guilty defendant go
free, fall somewhere in the middle of these two spectrums, but it
would be a mistake to simply place them on a footing as equally
desirable outcomes.1 86 Convicting the guilty defendant comports
with a general sense of justice, whereas letting the guilty defen-
dant go is unjust. However, to a certain extent, such an outcome
is acceptable in society as a check on the criminal justice system:
"Better that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suf-
fer."1 87 As a result, the outcome of conviction for a guilty
defendant is valued higher than the outcome that frees the guilty
defendant. '88 For the sake of this analysis at the moment, the fol-
184. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1. As Fonda's character points out, the usual forces of
self-interest, it can be assumed, do not exist in the jury context. See also Primus, supra note
51, at 1442. At any rate, for the purposes of this Part, the theory of an "offensive veto,"
whereby a self-interested juror threatens a veto in order to improve a bargaining position, if
such a circumstance actually exists at all, will be acknowledged, but set aside. See id. at 1443.
185. See Kalai, supra note 176, at 237.
186. But see id. at 237 (equating these two outcomes in order to simplify the analysis,
claiming that such an analysis eliminates a "vengeance motive" by the juror). It is not clear
why assigning different values to the two outcomes necessarily implicates a vengeance mo-
tive. It is certainly just as reasonable to assume that ajuror will experience no satisfaction in
convicting a guilty defendant beyond that associated with correctly and faithfully following
the court's instructions.
187. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 352, quoted in Alexander Volokh, n Guilty
Men, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1997). This principle is also a tenet of Islam. Id. at 179
n.41.
188. Of course, this ordering of preferences requires a number of assumptions about
how jurors view their duty asjudges of the facts and what value society might place on the
possible outcomes. These assumptions are not without support in the scholarly literature.
See, e.g., Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 1406 (arguing that the movie 12 Angry Men "stands for
the idea that convicting the innocent is a far greater miscarriage ofjustice than acquitting
the guilty"); Kalai, supra note 176, at 239 (noting the assumption that the mistake of convict-
ing an innocent defendant "is very costly to the juror"); Primus, supra note 51, at 1436-38
("False conviction is a terrible result, and a decision rule forjuries should strive to minimize
its occurrence, even if doing so raises the incidence of false acquittal.... On a weighted
preference model, requiring unanimity for conviction makes sense only if false conviction is
much worse than false acquittal.").
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lowing relative values will be assigned to each of the four outcomes:
Box A = 7, Box B = 1, Box C = 4, Box D = 10.189
In assigning probabilities to the two essential considerations by
the holdout juror (that the majority is correct or incorrect), a criti-
cal question must be answered: Is the holdout juror's decision one
that is made under conditions of uncertainty or risk? A decision
made under uncertainty is one in which the decision-maker has
little or no information on which to base a determination of the
odds that one of the triggering conditions is correct.' 90 A decision-
maker confronts risk, however, "when he or she can attach prob-
abilities to alternative states of the world with confidence."191 Of
course, for the holdout juror-or any juror, for that matter-the
decision to vote guilty or not guilty is not made in a vacuum. If it
were, the probabilities would be equal and the juror might as well
flip a coin, something which jurors are usually expressly forbidden
from doing in reaching a verdict. 192 Instead, the holdout juror has
the benefit of hearing the evidence of witnesses and the arguments
of counsel, as well as the discussion by the holdout's fellow jurors.
While it is rarely the case that a holdoutjuror has all of the desired
information to make a decision, it does not follow that the decision
to vote to convict or acquit is made in a state of absolute uncer-
tainty. Therefore, the decision is one made under risk.
9 3
Assigning probabilities to the relevant triggering conditions can
become a bit complicated. It is possible to construct a mathemati-
cal model to assist in determining the relative probabilities as a
distribution of evidence of guilt or innocence for a guilty person
189. As one scholar has noted, this calculus in normative decision theory "requires two
guesses: a guess about what the payoffs (i.e. the consequences or results) will be if the option
in question is chosen and a guess about how valuable those payoffs will be when they actually
accrue to the decision maker." BEACH, supra note 166, at 66-67.
190. SeeOrbell, supra note 177, at 130.
191. Id.
192. See, e.g., IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 207 (2005) ("Your verdict in this case
cannot be arrived at by chance, by lot, or by compromise."). After all, tossing a coin "is only
a means of coming to some decision. It is not a means of avoiding horrible error .... " Or-
bell, supra note 177, at 131.
193. Of course, this situation is better than the one Hamlet found himself in after he
initially heard the ghost's accusation. At that time, he had very little information, if any, to
rely on in making a decision about killing the king. See Orbell, supra note 177, at 131. Ham-
let was able to devise a "play within a play" to gather more information and turn his decision
into one of risk, rather than one of uncertainty. Id. at 135. Jurors, on the other hand, are
expressly prohibited from engaging in such activity. See, e.g., IDAHO CRIMINAL JURY IN-
STRUCTION 108 (2005) ("[D]uring this trial do not make any investigation of this case or
inquiry outside of the courtroom on your own. Do not go to any place mentioned in the
testimony without an explicit order from me to do so."); NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL
JURY INSTRUCTION 1.9 (2005).
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and an innocent person respectively.'94 For the purpose of simplify-
ing matters in order to demonstrate a relatively simple point, it is
not necessary to become quite so complex, particularly when it is
clear that probabilities of guilt or innocence are difficult, at best, to
coordinate with some objective view of evidence in a particular
case. In order to demonstrate the general trend of the decision
payoff calculus, it might be most helpful to survey three different
probabilities. First, let it be assumed that, as is presumed by the
current felony jury system, "Twelve heads are better than one." In
other words, since the holdout is faced with a vote of eleven jurors
in favor of conviction, the first assignment of probabilities will be
11/12 (.916) in favor of a correct majority and 1/12 (.083) in favor
of an incorrect majority.1
95
Under this assumption, the prescriptive economic model indi-
cates that the holdout juror should vote to convict with the
overwhelming majority, albeit the calculation is close. The calcula-
tion of payoffs is accomplished by multiplying the probabilities by
the values assigned to the various outcomes, and adding the results
for each decision. Thus, under this first assumption of probabili-
ties, the calculation appears as follows: Vote to Convict = .916(7) +
.083(1) = 6.495; Vote to Acquit = .916(4) + .083(10) = 4.494.
Because the probabilities assigned in the first probability distri-
bution are dependent entirely on the number of votes to convict
that exist against the holdout, consider a second probability distri-
bution for a relatively close case on the evidence: 51% to 49% in
favor of conviction. In this case, the holdout juror's decision is
clear: vote to acquit and break with the majority. The payoffs are
not even close.196 Even assuming that the relative values assigned to
the various outcomes are incorrect, and that holdout jurors in par-
ticular-or jurors in general-place a much lower value on the
conviction of an innocent person (say, negative 10), the gap only
grows wider, leading the rational holdoutjuror to vote not guilty.
This is not only true for close cases, however. Consider the third
and final probability distribution of a less close, but not over-
whelming, case in favor of the guilt of the defendant: 66% to 34%
in favor of conviction. Even in a case where the evidence appears
to line up in favor of the conviction of the defendant, given the
relative values placed on the various possible outcomes, it is not
close for the holdout juror: vote to acquit and frustrate the major-
194. See Kalai, supra note 176, at 237-38.
195. See BEACH, supra note 166, at 70-74 (explaining decision matrices and the calcula-
tion of expected values based on alternative decision options).
196. Under the second probability distribution, the calculation appears as follows: Vote
to Convict = .51 (7) + .49(1) = 4.06; Vote to Acquit = .51 (4) + .49(10) = 6.94.
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ity.17 In fact, given these relative outcome values, the "tipping
point" where the holdoutjuror is stymied with two options carrying
equal expected values is 75% in favor of the accuracy of the major-
ity in conviction and 25% in favor of an incorrect majority."" If it is
assumed that the value placed on the outcome of convicting an
innocent person is "-10" rather than "+10," the tipping point is
even more extreme: 87% in favor of the majority correctly convict-
ing the defendant and 13% in favor of the majority reaching the
incorrect conclusion. '9 Therefore, it appears that in almost every
case, assuming the consequences of the outcomes are valued cor-
rectly (or at least close), the holdout juror should vote to acquit
and thwart the will of the overwhelming majority.
This does not, however, end the inquiry. The psychology of the
holdout juror is indeed more complicated than the normative de-
cision model and payoff matrix would lead one to believe. This
leads the inquiry back to behavioral decision theory in order "to
study how people actually make decisions rather than how they
ought to make them., 20 0 The first problem is that when the prob-
abilities are not known with certainty-in this case regarding the
correctness of the majority view-the decision-maker must rely in
part on guesses about the actual probabilities. This is called the
person's "subjective probability" of deciding correctly.21' Because
jurors operate under conditions of incomplete information-
always without the evidence they wished they had or questions they
wished they could ask-they make decisions within a variation of a
model of subjective expected values in the payoff matrix.0 In most
behavioral decision analysis, this results in a gamble of sorts; the
decision-maker bets on the most likely choice and waits to see what
happens as a result.2 0 3 For jurors, it is more like a reverse gamble:
the holdout juror (in this case) makes the final decision to convict
or hold out for acquittal, and then hopes that the right decision
197. Under this final probability distribution, the calculation appears as follows: Vote to
Convict = .66(7) + .34(1) = 4.96; Vote to Acquit = .66(4) + .34(10) = 6.04.
198. Letting x equal the probability the majority is correct, the equation is as follows: 7x
+ 1 (l-x) = 4x + 10(l-x).
199. Following the same principle, this equation is as follows: 7x - 10(1-x) = 4x + 10(1-x).
200. BEACH, supra note 166, at 79.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 79-80. See also Osher, supra note 12, at 1348-49 ("[M]ost courts forbid jurors
to ask questions, take notes, or see transcripts of prior testimony."). There is no logical ra-
tionale for prohibiting jurors from taking notes or receiving copies of the jury instructions,
particularly in a lengthy criminal trial. Limiting such information only skews the probabili-
ties.
203. BEACH, supra note 166, at 81.
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was made. The unique position of the juror is that it may never be




Beyond behavioral decision theory is another theory of decision-
making called "naturalistic decision theory" that also focuses al-
most exclusively on the way decision-makers make their
decisions. °" This theory is "very much influenced by the need for
practical knowledge about real-world decision making,"2 0 6 and can
provide an insight into the psychology of the holdout juror that
prescriptive decision theory cannot. This theory is characterized by
the observation of "bounded rationality," which is described as fol-
lows:
Because decision makers' cognitive capacity is rather limited,
they must reduce information processing demands by simpli-
fying the problems they encounter. To do so, .... they
construct "small worlds" that are limited representations of
the problem at hand. The representation contains only the
most salient information, and the decision maker proceeds to
make his or her decision based solely on that "bounded" rep-
resentation. The decision may in fact be "rational" in that it
conforms to the prescriptions of the appropriate prescriptive
theory, but the decision maker uses only the information con-
tained in the bounded representation. °7
This describes rather well the experience of the juror and can be
particularly applied to the holdout juror in light of the unanimity
decision rule. The system encourages bounded rationality through
the court's closing instructions to the jury: "Your verdict must be
based solely on the evidence and on the law as I have given it to




The holdout juror is also faced with issues of "framing" and
"priming" merely by participation as a member of the jury panel.2 0
204. This assumes that the defendant continues to profess innocence regardless of the
outcome of the case. This unsatisfactory outcome for the holdout juror might implicate the
ultimate weakness of the prescriptive decision model in this context: i.e., that the proposed
payoffs may not ever be realized at all.
205. BEACH, supra note 166, at 9.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 10.
208. NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTION 7.2 (2005); See also IA FED-
ERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTION § 12.01 (5th ed. 2005); EIGHTH CIRCUIT MODEL
CRIMINALJURY INSTRUCTION 3.02 (2000).
209. Psychologists generally agree that decision frames are partly controlled by the for-
mulation of the problem, and partly controlled by the norms, habits, and characteristics of
the decision-maker. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981). Priming "refers to the incidental activation of
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As one scholar has noted, "[s]imply placing citizens on a jury sys-
tematically alters the way that they perceive situations and make
decisions. "21 Jurors take with them to the panel their preconceived
notions and beliefs about how jurors can and should behave. This
can lead to the jury system invoking "a legal cultural power that
challenges and competes with jurors' other cultural influences, 211
all of which can affect and alter decision-making. This tension has
been called "legal priming" and occurs "when folk theories about
the law are triggered in societal members."2 12 Social psychologists
describe this in general terms as the effect of "an environmental
event on subsequent thoughts, feelings, and behavior," noting that
once the prime has been "activated," "it exerts a passive effect on
the person that frequently cannot be controlled."
2 1 3
Priming presents a particular complication for the psychological
analysis of the holdout juror. Not only is there the prime that ac-
companies the mere placement on the jury panel at the beginning
of the trial, but there is the additional prime that becomes acti-
vated once an individual juror has been identified by the majority
as the lone holdout who is preventing a unanimous verdict. The
"holdout juror prime" is naturally influenced (and usually sud-
denly triggered) by the individual's preconceived notions about
the role of the holdout juror in society, and can be shaped by the
media, attorneys, anecdotes from friends, and, not to be over-
looked, the individual's culture.
In fact, cultural considerations in an increasingly diverse society
provide an additional layer of analysis to the holdout juror's
unique prime. One concern is that a legal prime that alters an in-
dividual's role as ajuror "endangers the role of cultural diversity in
decision-making" because 'jurors invoke shared constructs about
the law that are filled with biased information, including stereo-
types., 21 4 Cultural diversity, however, can be valuable to a jury's
deliberations in a number of ways, not the least of which is to assist
the jury's interpretation of a witness's words or experiences in ways
that might be missed by a more homogenous group.1 5 One study
has even found that 'jury ethnicity influenced perceptions of the
knowledge structures.., by the current situational context."John A. Bargh et al., Automatic-
ity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 230 (1996).
210. Levinson, supra note 22, at 1060.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1066.
213. Id. at 1068.
214. Id. at 1071-72.
215. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 48, at 1285.
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defendant's honesty and guilt. 21 6 The danger is that the legal
prime applicable to the holdout juror "could trigger 'majority'
thinking patterns in underrepresented communities, such that mi-
nority members conceivably could unconsciously discriminate
against members of their own community.",21
What the normative or prescriptive theories fail to take into ac-
count is that humans are inherently and "solidly anchored in a
social context" unique to the individualI.2 " The individual's social
context is made up of a number of social influences, including,
among many other things, culture, gender, race, ethics, morals,
and life experiences. This presents a much more complex picture
of the psychological process of the holdout juror who, through the
lens of the perception of how a holdout juror should behave and
think when faced with an overwhelming majority on the other side,
must decide whether to vote with the majority or continue the
deadlock and ultimately cause a mistrial. Against this intricate and
multi-faceted approach to the psychology of the holdout juror, the
next Part will examine how individuals who find themselves in the
unenviable position of standing alone against a roomful of strang-
ers actually behave.
B. The Pressure to Conform
"It's not easy to stand alone against the ridicule of others."
-Juror #9 in 12 Angry Men
219
A lone holdout juror preventing a unanimous verdict is certainly
subject to pressure, both internal and external, to vote with the
majority. In the jury deliberation context, "[s]ome degree of social
pressure is inevitable and perhaps even desirable." 2 0 What is less
certain is how a particular individual juror will behave under such
circumstances. One theory of dissent points to two choices pre-
sented the dissenter in the political context: "act moderately or
speak radically."2 2 ' In the case ofjuries, however, as will be seen be-
low, there are other options for the holdout, including withdrawal.
216. Id. at 1293.
217. Levinson, supra note 22, at 1073-74.
218. See BEACH, supra note 166, at 160 (describing the deontological theory of decision-
making).
219. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
220. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 185.
221. Gerken, supra note 2, at 1746.
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It would be a mistake to assume that an individual's personality
is the dominant factor in determining whether the holdout will
give in to the pressure or continue to dissent. Indeed, "the ten-
dency for people to overemphasize the influence of personality on
behavior and to underestimate the influence of the situation" has
been called by psychologists the "fundamental attribution error.
'2 2
What is clear from the empirical psychological literature is that the
jury's first vote on guilt is an excellent predictor of the final verdict,
and that a jury divided 11-1 in favor of guilt is "virtually certain to
convict."2 23 Under what circumstances, therefore, does a holdout
juror continue to persist to a true deadlock? And what pressure
comes to bear on the holdout in an attempt to influence his or her
vote? The following will explore these questions in more detail.
1. The Conformity/Independence
Studies of Solomon Asch
In the 1950s the psychologist Solomon Asch conducted studies
to investigate "the conditions of independence and lack of inde-
pendence in the face of group pressure. 24 These studies were
constructed to generate a disagreement between a single person
(the subject of the experiment) and a group of varying size (whose
members were collaborators with Asch and his colleagues) con-
cerning a "simple and clear matter of fact in the immediate
environment., 25 Even worse for the experiment's subject, however,
was that the group that disagreed with the individual was univer-
sally incorrect in its judgment of the fact in question, which in this
case, was the match of "the length of a given line-the standard-
with one of three other lines."2 6 After each member of the group
examined the lines in front of them, each one was asked to pub-
licly vote, in the order they were seated, on which of the three lines
227was the match for the standard line.
222. Orbell, supra note 177, at 139.
223. Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 1396.
224. Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: A Minority of One Against a
Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 1 (1956) [hereinafter Asch, Studies of Inde-
pendence and Conformity]; see also SOLOMON E. AscH, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 465-79 (1952)
(discussing initial methodologies and findings of these studies).
225. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity, supra note 224, at 1.
226. Id. at 1-3.
227. Id. at 3. The subjects of the experiment were white, male, college students between
seventeen and twenty-five years of age. Id. at 5. In this way, in addition to holding constant
the variables of race, gender, and age (to a degree), the study was able to focus on "the ef-
fect of a group of peers upon a minority of one." Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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The subject was manipulated by a prearranged seating arrange-
ment so that he consistently sat one position from the last member
of the group. As such, he would have an opportunity to hear the
votes of most of the other members of the group before his vote."'
The study placed the single individual "in the position of a minority
of one against a wrong and unanimous majority. Perhaps for the first
time this person found a massed majority contradicting the clear
evidence of his senses. 229 The members of the erroneous majority
were specifically instructed not to argue with the subject's vote or
perception, making them "far from militant or aggressive; rather
[they] tended to the side of impersonality."2 30 The goal of the study
was "to observe the impact of these conditions when the question
at issue was that of resisting or bowing to a prevailing group direc-
tion .
,,231
The results of the study were, at the time, truly astounding. Asch
found that most subjects voted with the erroneous majority at least
some of the time, defying their own senses.232 There were individu-
als on the extremes, either voting consistently with the majority or
expressing staunch (and accurate) independence, but most sub-
jects fell somewhere in the middle.3 In general, however, Asch
concluded that some subjects "were able to retain independence
for a number of trials but weakened with further exposure to the
majority, a change that might be accounted for in terms of mount-
ing pressure."234 Reaction from the subjects in a post-study
interview process ranged from initial self-doubt and denial to ac-
quiescence and suspicion of the majority, with many subjects
expressing "an oppressive sense of loneliness which increased in
prominence as subjects contrasted their situation with the appar-
ent assurance and solidity of the majority., 235 As the study noted,
228. Id. at 4. The votes occurred after each examination period, resulting in a number
of rounds of voting with different sets of lines for each subject. Id. at 21.
229. Id. at 3.
230. Id. at 4. This prevented the insertion into the study of any overt pressure other
than, of course, the mere fact that every member of the group was voting a particular way.
231. Id. at 2.
232. Id. at 21. This should not really be all that surprising since, as a general matter,
"[elighty years of experimental evidence strongly shows that individuals are influenced by
the actions and expectations of others." Bibb Latan6, The Psychology of Social Impact, 36 AM.
PSYCHOL. 343, 344-45 (1981).
233. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity, supra note 224, at 20.
234. Id. at 23.
235. Id. at 27-32. This loneliness persisted despite the fact that the "pressure" imposed
by the majority went completely unexpressed vocally. Id. Other studies have confirmed "that
the greater an individual's dependence upon another individual or group, the more he will
conform to that individual's position or to the group's norms." Bibb Latan6 & Sharon Wolf,
The Social Impact of Majorities and Minorities, 88 PSYCHOL. REv. 438, 439 (1981).
[VOL. 40:3
Standing Alone
"the most compelling reason for yielding was the intolerableness of
appearing different from the group when to do so had the mean-
ing of exposing oneself to suspicion of defect and disapproval.
2 '
6
Equally important as the conclusion that individuals succumb to
this perceived pressure due to an overwhelming sense of isolation
and desire to conform is Asch's further conclusion regarding those
subjects that maintained independence: "It is... unduly narrowing
to emphasize submission, to the neglect of the not inconsiderable
powers persons demonstrate on occasion for acting according to
conviction and rising above group passion. 237 Asch observed that
"independence requires the capacity to accept the fact of opposi-
tion without a lowered sense of personal worth.235 In a later article,
Asch further described the independent subjects as falling into one
of three categories: 1) "Independence based on confidence in
one's perception and experience;" 2) "[S]ubjects who are inde-
pendent and withdrawn;" and 3) "Subjects who expressed inner
doubt, but "felt necessity to deal adequately with the [assigned]
task.",239
This corollary conclusion about independent subjects is most
210relevant to the analysis of the psychology of the holdout juror.
Those subjects in the Asch studies who maintained their inde-
pendence throughout cannot be labeled as "eccentrics" or
"irrational" holdouts; they were merely relying on their senses and
perceptions, drawing correct conclusions about the facts in ques-
tion. They persisted in their independence in the face of consistent
236. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity, supra note 224, at 32. Lest the reader
conclude that the study is irreparably flawed by the exclusivity of the young, white, male
subjects, this study has been recreated with similar findings in at least one other culture. See
Felix Neto, Conformity and Independence Revisited, 23 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 217-22
(1995) (examining the Asch findings in light of the ability to replicate the results in differ-
ent cultures and finding that in a similar study of female psychology students in Portugal,
the subjects expressed "considerable distress under group pressure").
237. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity, supra note 224, at 3. See also Ronald
Friend, Yvonne Rafferty & Dana Bramel, A Puzzling Misinterpretation of the Asch 'Conformity'
Study, 20 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 29 (1990) (arguing that between 1953 and 1984, scholars
increasingly accentuated the role of the conformity aspect of the study and underestimated
the significance of the findings on independence).
238. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity, supra note 224, at 51. He further noted,
however, that there were also subjects who remained independent even though they became
convinced that the majority was correct. Id. at 70.
239. Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in READINGS IN SOC. PSYCHOL. 174, 178 (Eleanor E. Maccoby et al. eds., 3d ed.
1958).
240. Indeed, it can only be speculated how many jurors have voted with the majority de-
spite holding doubts, some of which might even have been "reasonable," because they could
not stomach the thought of standing alone in the face of the potential derision from the
majority.
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and repeated unanimous opposition to the conclusions they drew
from their perception of the evidence. This was true, even though
there were reports that these independent subjects experienced
increased isolation and loneliness during the course of the study.
The silent pressure placed on the outcast in this context pales in
comparison to the pressure experienced by the holdout juror
against a unanimous majority of jurors who have been ordered to
stay in a room until they reach a unanimous verdict through delib-
eration.
The psychological literature examining this dynamic reveals that
a holdout is isolated, punished, and eventually rejected by the ma-
jority altogether.
[T]he greater the number of people advocating a position,
the greater are their resources for rewarding those who con-
form to that position and punishing those who deviate....
When influence pressure is generated by a unanimous major-
ity, all of the social forces acting on an individual target will
241
pull him in the same direction.
Moreover, "[a]s the proportionate size of the deviate's subgroup
decreases, rejection of the deviate increases" to the point that the
majority views the deviate as less threatening because of a de-
creased likelihood that the deviate will "change the group opinions
or influence member's beliefs about the correctness of their opin-
ions."
242
As the holdout juror becomes more and more isolated, his par-
ticipation in the deliberation process decreases in direct proportion.
In the case where "a lone holdout opposed a majority of eleven ...
the holdout was strongly isolated from all deliberation processes.,243
Research has shown that although juries tend to vote in secret to-
wards the beginning of deliberation, they begin using more public
voting methods when they encounter difficulty reaching agreement
and one or more holdouts have been identified. 24 At the point
241. Latan6 & Wolf, supra note 235, at 439, 441. The authors call this "social impact
theory." Id.
242. Jasmine Tata et al., Proportionate Group Size and Rejection of the Deviate: A Meta-Analytic
Integration, 1J. Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 739, 749 (1996). This "rejection of the deviate"
can include the expression of blatant hostility, as group members perceive it to be "safer to
attack the deviates as the number of deviates decreases." Id. at 741, 743.
243. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 166. In that particular jury, the
holdout did not speak at all until two hours into the deliberation process, and when the
juror did finally attempt to speak, the majority cut off the discussion, causing the holdout to
withdraw from further discussion with the jury. Id.
244. KAssIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 203.
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where the majority numbers ten, its members "reject, ridicule, and
punish individuals who frustrate a common goal by adhering to a
deviant position."4 ' Even when the holdout juror attempts to ex-
press his or her position to the fellow members of the jury, "hostile
reactions send him back into his protective shroud of silence.",24
These findings concerning the holdout juror as the deviate in the
group, which detail the pressures of isolation, rejection, and pun-
ishment that ultimately lead to an effective withdrawal from the
active deliberation process, should sound familiar after a review of
the case law described in Part II. Yet the common reaction of trial
courts in concluding that the holdout juror is not deliberating with
his or her fellow jurors is to impose the ultimate sign of rejection:
the court's expulsion of the holdout juror from the jury altogether
instead of the declaration of a mistrial.
2. More Stress for Holdouts: Order Bias, Stubbornness,
and the Power of Two
In another study by Solomon Asch, subjects were asked to read a
list of personality traits that characterized a hypothetical person
and then speculate on how much they would like that person.
"Half of the subjects read that the individual was: intelligent, indus-
trious, impulsive, critical, stubborn, and envious. The other half
read the same list, but in the reverse order., 247 Rather than finding
that subjects indicated that they felt the same way about the hypo-
thetical person regardless of the order of the characteristics, the
study concluded that subjects who read the first list formed more
favorable impressions than subjects whose list began with the nega-
tive traits.248 Asch called this the "primacy effect"-that the first bits
of information received heavily determine a person's overall im-
pression-while other psychologists have referred to this as an
"order bias." 49
Even though jurors are instructed at the beginning of a trial not
to form any opinions about the case until they have heard all of the
245. Id. at 175.
246. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 232.
247. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 133 (citing Solomon E. Asch, Forming Im-
pressions of Personality, 41J. OF ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 258-90 (1946)).
248. Id.
249. Id. See also BEACH, supra note 166, at 137 (citing a study that found that "when
charges against a defendant were considered in decreasing, order of seriousness juries were
more inclined to convict on a serious charge than when the charges were considered in an
ascending order").
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evidence, social psychologists have found "that once people form
an opinion or develop a theory, even if based on the limited early
returns, they are unlikely to change their minds when confronted
with subsequent contradictory information. ,2 50 There are four rea-
sons this occurs: 1) "[O]nce a person has formed a belief, he or
she may unwittingly adopt a biased search for information and, in
doing so, procure false support for that belief;" 2) "[P] eople make
snap judgments ... and then assimilate subsequent information
into that first impression;" 3) "[O] nce people form an impression,
they discount or reject facts that challenge their views;" and
4) "[W] hen it comes time to make a decision, they will misremember
the evidence as having been more supportive than it actually
,,251
was.
Because so many cases decide in the direction of the initial ma-
jority, it can be extremely difficult for a minority faction, let alone a
minority of one, to persuade the majority to change its decision. ''
If any member of the jury shifts his vote from the initial position
taken during deliberations, that shift, regardless of whether it is for
conviction or acquittal, correctly predicts the final verdict ninety-
six percent of the time.' 3 Therefore, while jurors tend to be stub-
born in their initial assessment of the case, once a single member
of the jury shifts course, the others tend to follow.
Some empirical evidence has demonstrated that jurors process
information by creating a story in the context of a particular case
that "enables comprehension and organization of the evidence so
that evidence can be meaningfully evaluated. '" 4 As a result, jurors
who come to different conclusions about the verdict have simply
developed different stories to fit the evidence."" Of course, differ-
ences occur because the story created by a particular juror "was
250. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 133.
251. Id. at 133-35 (noting that some scholars have described these distorted percep-
tions as "naive realism"); Ross & Shestowsky, supra note 22, at 1090-91.
252. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 18, at 27.
253. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 203; see alsoJONAKAIT, supra note 30, at
103 & n.22 (noting that the minority faction rarely prevails in the verdict); Latan6 & Wolf,
supra note 235, at 451 (noting that the influence of the shift "actually derives from the per-
vasive influence of the majority"); Nemeth, supra note 46, at 54 (observing that the minority
only demonstrates a tendency to prevail when it expresses a desire to acquit).
254. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 192 (1992); see also Taylor-
Thompson, supra note 48, at 1278 ("[T]he individual juror constructs stories in an effort to
interpret evidence and to explain events in a trial.").
255. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 254, at 192. It is interesting to note, however, that
the movie 12 Angry Men does not follow this theory. Instead of constructing an alternate
stor; the holdout systematically disputes each piece of significant evidence until reasonable
doubt has been created. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
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heavily dependent on the juror's implicit theory of human behav-
ior-and not everybody had the same implicit theory.,
2
56
It is certainly possible to have conflicting stories based on the
evidence without being labeled "aberrant" or "eccentric." What
most critics of the holdout juror fail to realize is that the empirical
literature clearly demonstrates that it is extremely rare for a jury
split 11-1 early in the deliberations to not reach a unanimous ver-
dict. In almost every case where a lone holdout remains after a
period of deliberations, that person had at least some "companion-
ship at the beginning of deliberations. '257 This minority might have
been "whittled away" during the course of deliberations, but for
one holdout to remain unconvinced after that process is a persua-
sive indication "that the case itself must be the primary cause of a
hung jury. 
2 58
It is also clear from the empirical evidence that where the lone
holdout has at least one other member of the jury voting the same
way, either before becoming a lone holdout or after having con-
vinced someone to join him, the strength of the faction increases
significantly.2 59 In fact, studies have shown that "the presence in the
field of one other individual ... was sufficient to deplete the power
of the majority, and in some cases to destroy it. '260 As one legal
scholar simply put it: "A minority of two is many times stronger
than a minority of one.,
26 '
If a lone holdout emerges in the jury room after some period of
deliberations and is faced with the wide array of social and internal
pressures described here, then any influence from the trial court,
even if objectively viewed as innocent, can lead him to give up the
dissenting position and vote with the majority. The empirical find-
ings described in this Part support the conclusion that the trial court
should do everything possible to protect the status of a holdout ju-
ror or holdout faction. This is true regardless of whether the
minority consists of a split of 11-1 or 10-2. As the analysis of the case
law above illustrates, the problem of external judicial pressure on
the holdout is not automatically eliminated by the existence of a
partner in deliberations. If the holdout faction consists of two jurors,
and the trial court, regardless of whether there is any investigation,
256. BEACH, supra note 166, at 149.
257. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 16, at 463.
258. Id.; see alsOJONAKAIT, supra note 30, at 102.
259. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 16, at 463.
260. Asch, Studies ofIndependence and Conformity, supra note 224, at 180.
261. Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 1397. See also Rita M. James, Status and Competence ofJu-
rors, 64 AM.J. Soc. 563, 568 (1959) (discussing the power of the larger minority of jurors).
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removes one of the minority's members for perceived misconduct,
abusive language, or "refusing to deliberate" with the majority, the
remaining holdout is placed in an impossible situation, making it
unreasonable to persist in a posture of dissent.
The distinction in the holdout's vote appears in the difference
between two types of social influence. "Through information social
influence, people conform because they want to be correct in their
judgments and expect that when others agree with each other, they
must be right.... Through normative social influence, however,
people conform because they fear the negative consequences of
appearing deviant. 2 62 While some of what enters into a holdout's
thought process may include concerns about appearing to be un-
reasonably stubborn in an untenable position, "[n]ormative
influence exceeds an acceptable level whenever it leads people to
vote against their true beliefs., 263 Nowhere is the trial court's undue
influence in this regard more evident than in the delivery of an
Allen charge, also known as a "dynamite charge," that is delivered
after deliberations have begun when there is an indication that a
deadlock exists in the jury2 64 An equally daunting experience for
the holdout juror can be a trial court's inquiry process into the
conduct and deliberations of the jury. This occurs through indi-
vidual interviews, and culminates in the holdout being placed on
the spot after a member of the majority lodges some complaint
against his behavior that is certain to draw the court's attention.266
Such inherently coercive interference by the trial court at best
makes it difficult for the holdoutjuror to continue in a position of
dissent. At worst, it arguably undermines the right to a fair trial
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
2 66
262. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 175.
263. Id. at 185.
264. See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). Psychologists have expressed con-
cern that such a charge encourages jurors to compromise their viewpoints and gives the
impression that the trial judge agrees with the majority of thejury, causing the holdoutjuror
to capitulate. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 16, at 454. Because of these concerns, a trial
court should never deliver an Allen charge to a deadlocked jury where it has discovered that
the jury is divided eleven-to-one. A private Alien charge, in particular, that is delivered to the
holdout juror by the trial court is greatly offensive to the integrity of the jury's deliberations
and the holdout juror's opinion of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Zabriskie, 415 F.3d
1139 (10th Cir. 2005) (reversing conviction where trial court delivered private Allen charge
to holdoutjuror).
265. See supra Part II.
266. In 1977, one of the most in-depth analyses of a particularjury and its deliberations
was published following the conviction of Juan Corona for twenty-five counts of murder in
California. Based on thorough interviews of all twelve jurors, the work recreates the eight
days of deliberations that occurred in January 1973, and reflects a jury dynamic consistent
with the psychological literature discussed in this Article, including heated deliberations,
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TV. SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OFJURY DELIBERATIONS
"No jury can declare a man guilty without being sure."
-Henry Fonda in 12 Angry Men
267
The jury deliberation process will never-and should never-be
a place free from heated discussion, spirited debate, and the use of
myriad techniques to persuade. Decisions like these, after all, are
not made in a vacuum. Nevertheless, improvements to the process
can occur in order to ensure that the integrity of deliberations is
better protected to prevent outside parties from directly or indi-
rectly becoming additional participants in the jury's deliberations.
This Part outlines some of ways that the jury trial system can be
fine-tuned to respect the position of the holdout juror and, as a
result, improve the conditions for deliberations for the entire jury.
A. Insightful Courts: Steps in the Right Direction
Not all courts are unmindful of the difficult questions presented
by the appearance of a holdout juror accompanied by allegations
of misconduct during deliberations. Sensitive to the psychological
issues involved and the inherent coercion present in any form of
judicial intervention, some courts have even attempted to craft
standards of review to better balance the competing interests of the
holdout juror and the prevention ofjuror misconduct.
In State v. Elmore,2 68 the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the
reversal of a defendant's murder conviction by the Washington
Court of Appeals, holding that the trial court improperly removed
the lone holdout juror after an investigation into allegations that
the juror was refusing to deliberate further with the majority. The
court crafted a new standard for juror removal, holding that "a de-
liberating juror must not be dismissed where there is any reasonable
possibility that the impetus for dismissal is the juror's views of the suf-
ficiency of the evidence. 269 In reaching this conclusion, the justices
were sensitive to the tension, noting that the "[d] ismissal of a hold-
out juror ... risks violating the Sixth Amendment to an impartial
memory distortion, and the extensive efforts to convince a final holdout to vote with the
majority. SeeVICTOR VILLASE&JOR,JURY: THE PEOPLE VS.JUAN CORONA (1977).
267. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
268. State v. Elmore, 123 P.3d 72 (Wash. 2005).
269. Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
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jury."" When initially faced with an allegation of misconduct of the
holdout juror, therefore, "the trial court should first attempt to re-
solve the problem by reinstructing the jury. ,21 If that fails to resolve
the problem, however, the court should conduct a limited inquiry
that reflects "an attempt to gain a balanced picture of the situation;
it may be necessary to question the complaining juror or jurors,
the accused juror, and all or some of the other members of the
jury. 2 72 The court concluded that "the heightened standard re-
quires the trial court to err on the side of allowing the juror to
continue to deliberate if there is any reasonable possibility that the
juror's views are based on the sufficiency of the evidence.,
273
Faced with a similar situation, the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals developed its own standard in United States v. Thomas,274
holding that "a juror [can] be dismissed for a refusal to apply the
law as instructed only where the record is clear beyond doubt that the
juror is not, in fact, simply unpersuaded by the prosecution's
case." 275 The court recognized that "[o] nce a jury retires to the de-
liberation room, the presiding judge's duty to dismiss jurors for
misconduct comes into conflict with a duty that is equally, if not
more, important-safeguarding the secrecy of jury delibera-
tions.' '276 Noting that "the very act of judicial investigation can at
times be expected to foment discord among jurors,"277 the court
observed that a trial judge "faced with anything but unambiguous
evidence that a juror refuses to apply the law as instructed need go
no further in his investigation of the alleged [misconduct]; in such
circumstances, the juror is not subject to dismissal on the basis of
his alleged refusal to follow the court's instructions. 2 78 Therefore,
the court explained that when the requirement that the jury not
disregard the law conflicts with the inherent secrecy of jury delib-
erations, courts are "compelled" to protect "the secrecy of jury
deliberations at the expense of possibly allowing irresponsible ju-
ror activity.",2
79
While both of these standards were developed with the interests
of the holdout juror and the protection of the secrecy of delibera-
270. Id. at 79.
271. Id. at 80.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 83.
274. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606 (2d Cir. 1997).
275. Id. at 608 (emphasis added).
276. Id. at 618.
277. Id. at 620.
278. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
279. Id. at 623. The court defended this balance because "[t]o open the door to the de-
liberation room any more widely... would, in our view, destroy the jury system itself." Id.
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tions in mind, they both suffer from the same defect: there is no
clear limit on the extent of a court's investigation into allegations
of misconduct. In order to meet the "any possibility" standard of
the Washington Supreme Court, a trial court could continue the
inquiry into allegations of a refusal to deliberate or other miscon-
duct until such evidence was found. Surely at least one of the
majority jurors, and obviously the holdout juror, would express a
view that the holdout had questions about the sufficiency of the
evidence. The standard, although based in sound and insightful
principles of psychology, is really no standard at all; it depends en-
tirely on the trial court's interest in seeking out some indication
that the juror at issue has at least some disagreement with the ma-
jority's view of the evidence.
The Thomas court's "clear beyond doubt" standard is no better.
Although the court recognizes that some level of jury misconduct
is an acceptable tradeoff for the protection of the secrecy of delib-
erations, the standard itself leaves the trial court with the incentive
to conduct an extensive inquiry into the conduct of jurors during
deliberations in order to be convinced "beyond doubt" that the
juror is not properly considering the evidence in the case. The
court's reasoning would have led the reader to believe that the
standard being developed was one opposed to any form of judicial
inquiry after deliberations had begun. Instead, it turned out to
sanction, perhaps unintentionally, an extensive inquiry process by
the trial court faced with an allegation ofjuror misconduct.
2 0
B. The Value of Secrecy of Deliberations
The inherent problem underlying the entire process is that it is
impossible for a trial judge to meet any of these standards crafted
by the appellate courts without delving too deeply into the jury's
deliberations. Ultimately, this leads to the judge making credibility
determinations among various juror-witnesses. This tension is en-
hanced by the presence of a holdout juror standing alone against
the majority. In a competition between jury secrecy, the existence
of a holdout, and the potential for the technical existence of some
280. See generally Hannaford-Agor & Hans, supra note 73, at 1259 (discussing the Thomas
decision and noting that "it is often difficult to differentiate between a juror who intention-
ally disregards the law and a juror who genuinely has doubts about the evidentiary value of
trial testimony"); Frank A. Bacelli, Note, United States v. Thomas: When the Preservation of Juror
Secrecy During Deliberations Outweighs the Ability to Dismiss a juror for Nullification, 48 CATH. U. L.
REv. 125 (1998) (discussing the Thomas decision).
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form of juror misconduct, the holdout's interests and the secrecy
of the deliberations must win every time. As the Thomas court
pointed out: "The jury as we know it is supposed to reach its deci-
sions in the mystery and security of secrecy; objections to the
secrecy ofjury deliberations are nothing less than objections to the
jury system itself.",
2 '
The proper conclusion that follows from this reasoning is not
that a protective standard must be developed that allows the trial
court to conduct a limited inquiry into deliberations in order to
determine the existence or absence of misconduct by the dissent-
ing juror. Rather, in this situation, the dangers inherent in any
intrusion into the deliberation process at all after deliberations
have begun are sufficiently great to justify the prevention of all
forms ofjudicial inquiry other than to inquire as to the presence of
a deadlock.2  Consider the various possible courses of action a trial
judge can take when confronted with a note from one or more ju-
rors stating that a single juror is refusing to deliberate, ignoring
the law, not listening to fellow jurors, or engaging in some other
similar form of misconduct. The court could question each and
281. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 619. See also Note, Public Disclosures ofJury Deliberations, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 886 (1983) (discussing the dangers of post-trial interviews of jurors regarding the
substance of deliberations).
282. In order to guard against improper judicial influence of individual jurors and to
maintain the appropriate distance between the trial court and jury once deliberations have
begun, courts should answer all juror questions in writing. An added benefit of this practice
is to preserve the record for a potential appeal and avoid the risk that a court answering a
juror's question or comment might engage in an ad-libbed dialogue with the jury. It is not
uncommon for the court to receive an inquiry from one or more members of the jury indi-
cating a potential deadlock or impasse, and requesting further instruction. When faced with
such a request, the trial court should only ask two questions of the jury: 1) "Are you dead-
locked?," and 2) "Would further deliberation be useful?" There is no need to ask these
questions in open court when a simple written supplemental instruction will do. The author
is grateful to Hon. Joel D. Horton, District Court Judge, Idaho Fourth Judicial District, for
providing this fine example:
As I previously instructed you, you are to consider each other's views, and deliberate
with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your
individual judgment. However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as
to the weight or effect of evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant
because the majority of the jury feels otherwise or for the purpose of returning a
unanimous verdict.
If you conclude that you are hopelessly deadlocked and that further deliberations will
not be fruitful, the presiding juror should indicate on the face of the verdict form for
each count as to which there is deadlock the fact that the jury is deadlocked, without
revealing the numerical division of the jury panel, and should sign that verdict form.
A written response by the trial court in this situation will maintain and preserve the secrecy
of the jury's deliberations and will not unduly influence the substance or conduct of the
deliberation process.
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every juror about the potential misconduct, but this would require
an extensive discussion of the course of deliberations and would
serve to isolate the target juror, requiring the juror to explain and
defend her conduct to the court. As one scholar has noted: "[A]
juror who makes such a stand is forced to return to the jury room
to continue deliberation face-to-face with that same (now hostile)
majority. This is not exactly a tempting alternative. '83
The equally poor alternative is for the trial court to question
only the disgruntled and the target juror(s). This option does not
better prevent the isolation, nor the implied intimidation and co-
ercion, which is inherent in such a judicial inquiry. Instead, it
requires the court to make credibility determinations when faced
with conflicting evidence. Any inquiry of this sort, whether it in-
volves only the jurors at issue or the entire group, and whether it
consists of an interview of the panel as a whole or a series of inter-
views of individual jurors while the rest of the panel waits in the
jury room, irreparably harms the course of the jury's deliberations.
Suppose, for example, that after an inquiry by the court, it de-
cides to remove the holdout juror. As the cases above illustrate, the
result is a speedy verdict, involving little additional deliberation. If,
however, the court decides to retain the holdout juror after an in-
quiry into the juror's alleged misconduct, the target juror returns
to the deliberation room completely isolated and ostracized from
the group. At this point, the holdout juror would experience an
enormous-and likely irresistible-pressure to conform to the ma-
jority's view. The Supreme Court's reasoning in its holding that a
trial court's inquiry into the numerical division of the jury is re-
versible error is applicable to this type ofjudicial inquiry as well:
We deem it essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the
trial that the inquiry itself should be regarded as ground for
reversal.... Its effect upon a divided jury will often depend
upon circumstances which cannot properly be known to the
trial judge or to the appellate courts and may vary widely in
different situations, but in general its tendency is coercive. It
can rarely be resorted to without bringing to bear in some de-
gree, serious, although not measurable, an improper
influence upon the jury, from whose deliberations every con-
sideration other than that of the evidence and the law as
expounded in a proper charge, should be excluded. Such a
283. Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment injury Reform,
34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 152 (1996).
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practice, which is never useful and is generally harmful, is not
to be sanctioned.8 4
If such reasoning applies to a judicial inquiry into the numerical
division of the jury, then surely it applies even more significantly to
a judicial inquiry into the alleged misbehavior of a single juror,
particularly a holdout, against the majority after deliberations have
begun. Jury secrecy in deliberations and the protection of the
holdout juror against coercion are so sacrosanct that any judicial
inquiry into the type of misconduct described in this Article is
likewise not to be sanctioned.
The implications of such a bright-line rule respecting the secrecy
of deliberations quickly become evident. A certain amount ofjuror
misconduct will be tolerated in order to protect the integrity of
deliberations in this context. s5 It does not mean, however, that ju-
rors can never be removed for the type of misconduct described in
this Article after deliberations have begun. If, for example, the
court received a note from the holdout juror clearly stating an in-
tention not to follow the law or the court's instructions, the court
can, and should, immediately remove that juror without any in-
quiry at all.286 When the trial court is able to determine that a juror
is refusing to deliberate or follow the court's instructions based
solely on the material provided it by that juror's note or letter, then
the removal of the offending juror does not interfere with the in-
284. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450 (1926).
285. What constitutes juror misconduct in many cases can become a difficult question
after deliberations have begun. As a general rule, in order to protect the holdout juror, a
trial court should never remove ajuror from the panel after deliberations have begun based
on an allegation from one or more members of the majority that he has simply refused to
deliberate further. Such behavior should never be viewed as juror misconduct requiring the
offender's removal from thejury.
On the issue of misconduct, it is ironic that the movie 12 Angry Men, a film that has been
quoted throughout this Article and described by scholars as depicting an ideal jury and "our
ideal juror" in Henry Fonda, also contains one of the most blatant examples of juror mis-
conduct. See Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 1399 n.44. Relatively early in the deliberation
process in the movie, the jurors discuss the testimony of the shopkeeper who sold the young
defendant a knife with an intricate, unique handle the same day that a knife with the same
handle was found stuck in the body of the deceased victim. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
Henry Fonda, in a moment of high drama, pulls out a knife with the same handle and
thrusts it into the wooden deliberation table, proudly proclaiming that he bought it during a
break in the trial in a shop around the corner from the defendant's house. Id. Although an
excellent example of juror misconduct that would have required his removal had the court
discovered it, few viewers would have approved of such a result.
286. See, e.g., United States v. Geffrard, 87 F.3d 448 (11 th Cir. 1996). As soon as the trial
court received the lengthy letter from the juror who identified herself as a follower of the
teaching of Emanuel Swedenborg and what that entailed, it became instantly clear that the
juror was unable to fulfill her duties as ajuror and should have been immediately removed.
See id. (including a copy of the entire letter).
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tegrity of deliberations or implicate issues of coercion or intimida-
tion. 87
CONCLUSION
"There are a lot of questions I would've liked to ask."
-Henry Fonda, 12 Angry Men
2 8
Bridging the gap between empirical psychological research (and
other social sciences) and the law is worth further pursuit. There is
much that can be learned by applying well-researched principles of
psychology to the development and implementation of legal sys-
tems, particularly in the context of jury trials. Jurors are complex,
and especially in the case of holdout jurors in a criminal justice
system in which the near-universal decision rule is that a verdict be
unanimous, the lessons of psychology can help shape and explain
the law so that the interests of holdout jurors are protected. In the
long run, this protects a defendant's right to a fair trial.
In this endeavor, it is important to recognize that all jurors have
different life experiences, perspectives, and even biases-few are
blessed (or cursed) with a sterile 'impartiality'-and that the coun-
terbalancing and juxtaposition of these different points of view
results in a jury that is far more thorough, more accurate, and
more fair than a jury of twelve impartial clones could ever hope to
be.
289
287. Although this Article does not attempt to resolve or extensively discuss the norma-
tive debate concerning juror nullification, it is entirely possible that a prohibition against
judicial investigation in this context will mean that a holdout juror could, if so inclined,
create a deadlock based on a nullification motive. As one scholar has pointed out, "[wIhen
we speak of nullification today, we mean holdout jurors: one or two jurors, convinced either
that the criminal sanction with which the defendant is threatened is unjust or that the de-
fendant himself does not deserve to be punished, foil the ten or eleven who would render a
guilty verdict." Menard, supra note 51, at 188. While there exists a potential that an individ-
ual juror could essentially nullify the deliberation process by dissenting, the likelihood of
this occurring is mitigated by the limitation previously discussed that such judicial inquiry
into this type of alleged misconduct should be prohibited only after some period of delib-
eration has already occurred. If there is a nullifier lurking among thejury panel, that person
is likely to be quickly identified at the very beginning of deliberations and, if brought to the
attention of the court, can be swiftly removed before the deliberation process has reached
the substantial merits of the evidence. This lessens the concerns over improper intrusion by
the court into the deliberation process.
288. 12 ANGRY MEN, supra note 1.
289. Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 1407.
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Indeed, more research is needed from a deontological approach
to analyze the influence that forces such as "moral obligation and
commitment" have on human behavior in the jury deliberation
process. 90 As one scholar put it, "[i] t is high time that theory and
research acknowledge the powerful impact of decision makers' be-
liefs, values, morals, ethics, obligations, and duties."2 9 1 Although
speaking more to the psychologist than the lawyer, this statement
rings even more true in the context of an ever-growing heteroge-
neous jury pool from which decision-makers in criminal trials are
drawn.
More research is also needed to examine the "story model" of
jury decision-making, the effect of Allen charges on the actual deci-
sions of the jury (including its dissenters), 92 and the emerging field
of "cultural psychology" to help explain how juries make decisions
relative to life experience and how culture impacts thought.29 3 Fi-
nally, a variation on Asch's ground-breaking research should
explore the reverse problem with respect to the holdoutjuror; that
is, the insertion into an unwitting group of a lone dissenter who
makes observations that are clearly contrary to the senses of the
unified majority. Without allowing verbal discussion, a strict ex-
amination of the nonverbal reactions of the majority would be
instructive to gain a more complete understanding of the pressure
to conform faced by a lone holdoutjuror.
The holdout juror standing alone against an overwhelming ma-
jority is an object of both praise and derision in American society.
Few juries take the course of 12 Angry Men, but more than a few
contain lone dissenters who refuse, for whatever reasons, to vote
with the majority. Before dismissing such individuals as eccentric or
irrational, the legal community should look to other disciplines,
including cognitive psychology, to understand better the circum-
stances under which there exists a holdout juror at all. In a system
of unanimity requirements and increasing evidence complexity, a
lone dissenter who has an honest disagreement with the rest of the
jury regarding the existence or absence of reasonable doubt de-
serves as much respect and deference as any member of the
overwhelming majority. The preservation of a fair trial and notions
ofjustice require no less.
290. See BEACH, supra note 166, at 159-61 (explaining the deontological paradigm).
291. Id. at 194.
292. See KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 15, at 194 (noting that there is no empirical
evidence examining why Allen charges are so successful at producing verdicts).
293. See Levinson, supra note 22, at 1064.
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